First and Second Person by Bryce Hidysmith

 Not to be Reproduced - Rene Magritte, 1937

Not to be Reproduced - Rene Magritte, 1937

< Soundtrack: Mission of Burma - That’s When I Reach For My Revolver >

Freud took a pretty defensible position that people were driven internally. While those drives interfaced with the lives of others and an individual might be compelled to interact with others in a certain manner, this did not imply that the individual in question would only “feel as though they were themselves” when they were engaged in a specific practice with other persons. The characteristics of the individual were assumed to be influenced by their personal history which, if containing social elements, would be partially socially determined. However, while focusing on the ways that identity was socially formed, Freud did not treat identity as dependent on recognition by an eternal party. Most obviously, Freud’s idea of Sublimation—the notion that internal drives that are not socially acceptable are remapped onto socially acceptable actions—suggests that there may be drives that are not constructed out of social relation. The alternative is that the drives that are sublimated are always those that were formatted in a previous state of social relation, and that by immigrating to a new social system, drives must be sublimated in order to achieve acceptance.

Lacan, in contrast, seems to assume that human identity is dependent on social relation. This is evidenced by his idea of the “Mirror Phase,” where an infant looks at itself in the mirror and identifies itself, identifying that its physical presence is stable, while its internal experience may be polymorphic and, more importantly, non-commital and non-specific. Lacan believed that this self-recognition was alienating, in that the act of comparison revealed apparent asymmetries between the self and the self-image. He extended this idea to a general philosophy that the informational asymmetries between organisms were always unbridgeable. Here’s a quote from The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function. I’m sorry that it’s borderline unreadable, but I think it’s right to support this part with the text:

It establishes a genetic order in ego defenses, in accordance with the wish formulated by Anna Freud in the first part of her major book, and situates (as against a frequently established prejudice) hysterical repression and its returns at a more archaic stage than obsessive inversion and its isolating processes, situating the latter as prior to the paranoiac alienation that dates back to the time at which the specular I turns into the social I
     This moment at which the mirror stage comes to an end inaugurates, through identification with the imago of one’s semblable and the drama of primordial jealousy (…) the dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations. 
     It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into being mediated by the other’s desire, constitutes its objects in an abstract equivalence due to the competition from other people, and turns the I into an apparatus to which every instinctual pressure constitutes a danger, even if it corresponds to a natural maturation process. The very normalization of this maturation is henceforth dependent in man n cultural intervention, as is exemplified by the fact that sexual object choice is dependent upon the Oedipus complex. 

Excuse my forcing you to experience Lacan’s prose. The core idea here that needs to be expressed is, of course, “it is in this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into being mediated by the other’s desire, constitutes its objects in an abstract equivalence due to the competition from other people, and turns the I into an apparatus to which every instinctual pressure constitutes a danger, even if it corresponds to a natural maturation process.” If I am to take the liberty of imposing meaning on this sentence, I interpret it to mean that everything that an individual can know, about himself or otherwise, is fundamentally socially mediated. That is to say, Lacan is suggesting that the act of being conscious is the act of being observed and contextualized by an external agent.

I must disclaim that these ideas are largely conjecture, as I find Lacan almost entirely unreadable and have only read sections and commentaries outside of the essay quoted above, and I’ve only made it through Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, Totem and Taboo, The Ego and the Id, and part of Moses and Monotheism, and have not exhaustively searched any of those texts for description of identities that are only identities when engaged in a social practice. However, even if the above paragraphs are scholarly indefensible based on further readings from Lacan and Freud, they suggest an interesting idea about how the self is experienced by an individual.

We can look at two opposing ideas of what it means to be a conscious human: Freud’s, where the self is composed of drives authored by the self, and Lacan’s, where the only drives that are authored by the self exist post-Mirror Phase, and thus are social. We might then note that this implies that there are two drastically different ideas of what it means to be “a self” in psychology. There is the internally-produced, independent, first-person model of Freud, and the relationally-produced, dependent, second-person model of Lacan. While empirical claims as to the nature of humanity in a non-socially influenced state are of course impossible to gain—I have never met a feral or fully wild human, separate from social influence, and I have not thus far found reputable information as to the psychology of reputable documented cases—there is something to be gained by comparing the two models of selfhood rationally without experimental evidence.

Mainly, the first-person self is a limited sovereign, able to take action on its own terms, and set up terms of engagement with other persons. This is akin to what one might naturally assume that a human is, if one assumes that a human is an animal with some unique characteristics, but none that violate the basic assumptions of animal-nature. While the first-person is always subject to the Byzantine Generals Problem, it is able to commit to action internally and arbitrarily, as it is able to self-authorize action as a best guess. Under conditions of uncertainty, which is to say all conditions in the material world, there is nothing better that one could hope for. Some of this population may have an ego or “self-image” that they use to inform their decisions, but it is not actually necessary for them to exist unless they need to be worried about others shaming them for the characteristics of their externally witnessed self-image.

In contrast, the second-person self is not able to come to terms with other individuals as it always is attempting to abide by implicit terms that it assumes to already be present. When it contends with the Byzantine problem, it runs up against a basic inability to self-authorize action as it does not have an internal feedback loop to justify a best guess. This likely produces an effect where the second-person self reliably launders its own desires by pretending they were the desires of another, as if the individual is still alive, it must have maintained enough basic biological drives to maintain its own body. This is an extreme reading of what Lacan wrote—he did say only that the whole of human knowledge is mediated by the other’s desires. Even if one assumes that it is only social desire and social knowledge that is immersed in this “paranoiac alienation,” one must understand that the relational self is never able to internalize the idea that something could be fully socially condoned, as it lacks the ability to hold onto its best guess without further validation from external social sources. The core failure of the relational-self is its inability to decide, from its internal felt-sense of aesthetics, that something is valid. Thus, it is never able to build foundations of trust, decency, or any other kind of benevolent precedence. The second-persons are always hungry, and no matter how much they eat they are never full.

Lacan was likely being empirical. While I believe he frequently lied in his work and was something of a con artist—the “variable length session” comes to mind—I do not think that he could have devoted his life to an entirely inaccurate model of the world unless he was intending to shift the world to that model. This leaves one with the question as to why he would do it, as the life of second-persons seems to never achieve satisfaction, and Lacan described a psychology of persons who never feel rewarded in any meaningful way, nor ever feel as though they are really understood by anyone, perhaps even by themselves. Thus, one must assume that Lacan did indeed witness persons with relational senses of self, and did indeed believe that it was necessary to contend with their existence. His opinions on the strategy of contending with such a population are unclear, and after some an examination I have found his analysis lacking and am convinced that myself and any reader interested in attempting to find solutions to such political problems is better off starting over than searching the Lacanian archives.

In conclusion, it seems necessary to slightly validate Lacan while wholeheartedly taking Freud’s position, viewing the second-person self as an unfortunate permutation of human behavior that comes out of traumatic experiences and low trust environments. Empirically, I have also conversed and even worked with these hollow men and women, and I would expect that some number of my readers are among their ranks. However, I have also met many more first-person individuals who are able to reliably take their own perspective, and while their existence is disincentivized by a great number of institutions in the modern world—compulsive schooling, corporate culture, authoritarian and democratic politics—it is within them that I believe the vast majority of hedonic human experience and human ingenuity exists.

Bromden, What Will it Take To Make You Capitulate? by Bryce Hidysmith

 Some light body horror for sale in BUD Airport duty free, Nov. 2018. I’m fairly sure they were skincare products, not sex toys, but, well, Europe.

Some light body horror for sale in BUD Airport duty free, Nov. 2018. I’m fairly sure they were skincare products, not sex toys, but, well, Europe.

< Soundtrack: Grimes - We Appreciate Power >

I’m surprised that I’ve never seen either the left or right Accelerationists talk about One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. I’ll be disregarding the film adaptation, which, though it has some high-grade acting, misses the entire point of the novel due to consequence of its medium making the acts of McMurphy the dram, rather than the commentary of Bromden. The interior perspective of Chief Bromden is, frankly the uniquely interesting part of the book; the rest is just an uncouth prison drama. I’m inclined to think that a better way to think about OFOTCN is that it’s a story from the perspective of Bromden, as he is only able to contextualize the triumph of pseudo-capitalism in America as something equivalent to a unfriendly artificial intelligence of the paperclip maximizer variety. He terms this process as “the Combine.” The goals of the Combine are pretty well stated in this section:

The Big Nurse tends to get real put out if something keeps her outfit from running like a smooth, accurate, precision-made machine. The slightest thing messy or out of kilter or in the way ties her into a little white knot of tight-smiled fury. She walks around with that same doll smile crimped between her chin and her nose and that same calm whir coming from her eyes, but down inside of her she’s tense as steel. I know, I can feel it. And she don’t relax a hair till she gets the nuisance attended to - what she calls “adjusted to surroundings.”
Under her rule the ward Inside is almost completely adjusted to surroundings. But the thing is she can’t be on the ward all the time. She’s got to spend some time Outside. So she works with an eye to adjusting the Outside world too. Working alongside others like her who I call the “Combine,” which is a huge organization that aims to adjust the Outside as well as she has the Inside, has made her a real veteran at adjusting things. She was already the Big Nurse in the old place when I came in from the Outside so long back, and she’d been dedicating herself to adjustment for God knows how long.

"The Outside” of course refers to outside the psych ward, as “the Inside” refers to inside the psych ward. This next quote points to perhaps the core conflict of the book:

Across the room from the Acutes are the culls of the Combine’s product, the Chronics. Not in the hospital, these, to get fixed, but just to keep them from walking around the streets giving the product a bad name. Chronics are in for good, the staff concedes. Chronics are divided into Walkers like me, can still get around if you keep them fed, and Wheelers and Vegetables. What the Chronics are - or most of us - are machines with flaws inside that can’t be repaired, flaws born in, or flaws beat in over so many years of the guy running head-on into solid things that by the time the hospital found him he was bleeding rust in some vacant lot.

And, later:

Yes. This is what I know. The ward is a factory for the Combine. It’s for fixing up mistakes made in the neighborhoods and in the schools and in the churches, the hospital is. When a completed product goes back out into society, all fixed up good as new, better than new sometimes, it brings joy to the Big Nurse’s heart; something that came in all twisted different is now a functioning, adjusted component, a credit to the whole outfit and a marvel to behold.

Bromden blames himself for failing to fit into the Combine’s progam, while also understanding that the Combine’s program is destroying everything he values. The mental patients, as “culls from the Combine’s product” are unable to participate in the American system, which is to say adequately adapted to an artificial environment built by the Combine manifesting its destiny all over the place. However, Bromden still frequently takes the perspective of the Combine as legitimate, as seen in the above quote. McMurphy, only feigning insanity in the hope of avoiding a sentence of hard labor, is able to act outside of the frame control of “the Combine,” leading to the events of the book. The central tragedy of the novel should not be understood as McMurphy’s failure to successfully lead a rebellion of inpatients, but Bromden’s simultaneous self-knowledge of the moral and aesthetic bankruptcy of the system he lives within, and his inability to take a perspective that’s able to critique it with an external source of justification.

I’ll leave off here, as it’s probably just best to read the book to get Bromden/Kesey’s perspective on what the goals of the Combine are, but it’s worth noting that the video game Half-Life 2 would later take this idea and run with it, naming their alien adversary after the Combine. In Half-Life 2, the Combine a force that attempts to fold all technological and biological life into itself, draining entire oceans in the process. It’s not as though the Combine has a goal in Half Life 2 other than unifying the universe into a single program of behavior at all costs. They don’t appear to have values other than convergent instrumentality in service of unity of control, leading them to come off as comically evil in a uniquely justifiable way. The highly threatening aliens that invaded the Black Mesa Complex in Half Life 1 are implied to be refugees from the Combine, and under the maxim of ‘the enemy is my enemy is my friend,’ they chose to ally with humanity against the greater threat of the Combine in pt. 2. This is some oddly deep literary criticism for a blockbuster video game, but Valve was pretty great back in the day.

Lastly, I think it’s probably worth noting the lyrics to the Panic At The Disco Song “High Hopes,” which I will certainly not link here. It peaked at No. 5 on the Billboard Hot 100 earlier this year, and which sends a chill down my spine every time I heard it on the radio:

Mama said
Fulfill the prophecy
Be something greater
Go make a legacy
Manifest destiny
Back in the days
We wanted everything, wanted everything
Mama said
Burn your biographies
Rewrite your history
Light up your wildest dreams
Museum victories, everyday
We wanted everything, wanted everything

Addendum, Dec. 10 2018: Passed through Eugene, Oregon tonight. The statue of Kesey here is an abomination and should be removed and melted down. End addendum.

On the defensive policy of the Sentinelese by Bryce Hidysmith


< Soundtrack: Bif Naked - Spaceman, a direct inversion of the Sentinelese sentiment.>

The recent death of an American missionary on North Sentinel Island has stirred a few thoughts in me. Firstly, I am now even more convinced that the armed response of the Sentinelese was justified, due to the fact that their initial context with the outside world was through the actions of colonial officer Maurice Vidal Portman. His is Wikipedia page glosses over the majority of the grim details. He was a man who was not only known previously for kidnapping Andaman Islanders and staging them in mock-Greek homoerotic compositions, but who proceeded to abduct six Sentinelese from their homeland, two adults and four children, and returned the four children when the two adults sickened and died from foreign pathogens that they would have no immunity to, dropping the island’s population from perhaps 9000 to only a couple hundred. This thread from @respectablelaw on Twitter is a remarkable download and media stash on the subject and the preceding paragraph is basically just a recap of @respectablelaw’s account, but the most interesting fact is that Portman’s aggression in 1880 is only just now out of living memory. This means that the narrative of alien peoples as sadistic aggressors and bringers of pathogens would be clear to the now-living Sentinelese, with the clear specification that close contact might carry deadly microbes.

I am entirely unsure and largely doubtful that the Sentinelese have a germ theory of disease. In the Western context, germ theories were proposed as far back as Thucydides and Lucritius, and given that the Roman Legions primarily died from wounds in battle rather than disease as Medieval European armies did inclines me to think that the Roman scientific consensus was something equivalent to a germ theory. The fact that the Western medical tradition lost this knowledge, and was so incoherent as to fail to put into practice the undeniable discovery of Leeuwenhoek until Semmelweis instituted hand-washing in his obstetrics clinic at the Vienna General Hospital baffles the mind. However, such a historical trajectory should not be taken as normative, and I am inclined to believe implies a society with substantial barriers to deliberation on scientific subjects, rather than a space of reasonably free discourse.

Given that the Sentinelese were until recently a stone-age people, I doubt that they have a social structure that frees up enough labor to allow the irresponsibility inherent to the profession of the researcher, and I believe that without such a class of person it is implausible that formal theories could be developed. (This is, perhaps, my main vindication of the moral worth of agricultural society.) However, implicit or explicit Sentinalese epidemiological consensus must describe a similar causal mechanic to germ transmission at the relevant level of abstraction to demand the strategic necessity of isolation. This points to the fact that a culture’s level of descriptive materialism must only be sufficient to avoid existential threats, and that as long as existential threats have been accounted for, non-materialist conceptions of the world can still procedurally advance technology by refining heuristics, as the adaptation of iron scavanged from the wreck of the Primrose by the Sentinalese attests directly.

This points to a degree of hope for industrial civilization as well, as it provides a method of specifying policy criteria rather than the fear, uncertainty, and doubt common in environmentalist, foreign policy, and AI risk fields, to say nothing of the potential utter idiocy of our interplanetary communications under the potential of a Dark Forest scenario, something that the late Stephen Hawking noted well when he stated that aliens would be “vastly more powerful and may not see us as any more valuable than we see bacteria.” Indeed, the behavior of Portman to the Sentinelese suggests that this may be more normative than we would like. Before moving on I must also make note of Douglas Vakoch’s remarks, suggesting that sufficiently advanced aliens would be able to pick up I Love Lucy. This suggests not that we should be attempting to make contact, but that we should be attempting to refine behavior on earth to something that might be deemed respectable by sovereign alien attitudes, and that making pre-emptive contact before developing ourselves into such a state might appear highly threatening, or at the best dull and needy.

Secondly, there are some interesting theological arguments as to the behavior of John Chau, the missionary who recently met his end at the point of a Sentinelese arrow. This was not the first time that Chau had attempted to visit the island, for he had attempted contact previously, shouting “My name is John, I love you and Jesus loves you,” before the Sentinelese opened fire, one of their arrows piercing his waterproof bible. I am not inclined to believe in acts of god, but if I am to contend with a theistic ontology for a moment, there is something to be said for the idea that the Christian God did in fact save John Chau that once from his foolishness, but in his omnipotence was unwilling to do so a second time as Chau had proven himself entirely beyond reason.

Thirdly, there is something to be said about the nature of sovereignty in the modern context. There was—and I guess still is as the news cycle isn’t over—a potential for this to turn into a truly nasty moment in Indian-American relations. The Sentinelese are, in effect, a sovereign people, but at the same time they are a sovereign people empowered by the Indian government’s ability to declare them an exception to otherwise normative claims of rights of movement. This seems to be a very good illustration of how Schmitt’s definition that “the sovereign is the one who decides the exception” can produce nested sovereignty. It is also interesting to note that the Indian government’s ability to coordinate with the Sentinelese has been dependent on their ability to produce a consistence foreign policy. If the Sentinelese had ever failed to maintain their exclusion policy, it is possible that a narrative of a divided society among them could have materialized, and attempts at contact may have become more aggressive. Given that Evangelical Christianity is based on an assumption that the Christian knows the heathen better than the heathen knows himself, it is able to produce an internally justified cause for contact even if contact means further plagues for the Sentinelese as the living world is seen as temporary and irrelevant in the face of eternity. Such reckless and destructive behavior is unfortunately fit and adaptive, and this case likely provides some set of clues for the criteria a class of ideologies that can justify similar types of consent violation. All ideologies of such a class would terminally produce monocultures, and must be understood to be inherently threatening due to their infinite ambitions.

…a horrifically imperfect modern day Osiris by Bryce Hidysmith

<Soundtrack: Laibach - Vor Sonnen-Aufgang >

Over breakfast a few mornings ago in Bassersdorf, J. and I discussed a remarkably amusing alternate history: Imagine if Lincoln survived Booth’s assassination attempt, and only walked away with severe brain damage. Here are some details of the wound from Wikipedia:

Booth opened the door, stepped forward, and shot Lincoln from behind with a derringer.[2] The bullet entered Lincoln's skull behind his left ear, passed through his brain, and came to rest near the front of the skull after fracturing both orbital plates.[c][41] Lincoln slumped over in his chair and then fell backward.[43][44] Rathbone turned to see Booth standing in gunsmoke less than four feet behind Lincoln; Booth shouted a word that Rathbone thought sounded like "Freedom!"[45]

One can imagine an alternate wound. Provided that the bullet passed through the skull, rather than being lodged in the skull and transferring all of its kinetic energy, the bleeding could potentially have been bandaged and stabilized by the multiple surgeons in attendance to the performance. While the period lacked modern neurosurgery, there were certainly individuals who received substantial facial and cranial trauma and survived. Pvt. Jacob C. Miller, for instance, survived a direct gunshot wound to the forehead in a battlefield context, and though I have not found a source as to the type of bullet that struck him, my estimate is that it would be a rifle or musket shot with both substantially more velocity and mass than the mere derringer that killed president Lincoln. Given that Lincoln also died at 7AM the next morning rather than immediately through blood loss or immediate loss of automatic nervous function, it also seems that the doctors with him were reasonably competent in their action to remove blood clots, as they empirically noticed that such removals improved the president’s breathing.

If the bullet had not transferred all of its kinetic energy, it would have simply disrupted a large amount of cranial tissue and broken two sections of the skull, as in the case of Phineas Gage. Likely, the amount of tissue disruption would have been more minor, simply due to the fact that that the diameter of the derringer’s ammunition would have been much smaller than the 3.2 cm of the railroad spike that pierced Gage’s skull. After Gage’s wound, his personality shifted dramatically, likely due to the severe disruption of the frontal lobe. Quoting from John Martyn Harlow’s account of the matter, “Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar Through The Head”:

The equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intel­lec­tu­al faculties and animal pro­pen­si­ties, seems to have been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not pre­vi­ous­ly his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times per­ti­na­cious­ly obstinate, yet capricious and vac­il­lat­ing, devising many plans of future operations, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others appearing more feasible. A child in his intel­lec­tu­al capacity and man­i­fes­ta­tions, he has the animal passions of a strong man. Previous to his injury, although untrained in the schools, he possessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of operation. In this regard his mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaint­ances said he was "no longer Gage.”

Thus, one can imagine a radically changed Lincoln along this dimension or others, still commander in chief with three more years in his term after having survived the assassination attempt. While I must consider it beyond me to speculate usefully on specific hypothetical shifts in Lincoln’s personality that might have occurred, the potential for such a shift shows the fragility of the passage of the 13th Amendment, the potential further difficulties of maintaining control over the South by the Unionists if who is in our timeline a martyred hero is instead an erratic, disfigured malcontent. However, the larger social context is also worth considering in this matter, as Lincoln would have certainly developed a substantial religious following in the months after his near demise. Given that the Spiritualist Movement was only growing in strength, powered in our timeline by the substantial number of bereaved friends and relatives of soldiers killed-in-action, the idea of Lincoln as some sort of death-defying bridge between the worlds of the living and the dead would be highly attractive to the average person. He might be seen as the second coming of Christ, claimed that he died for a few minutes, and then rose, likely narratized as having died for three days by large sections of the US peripheral to the eastern urban centers. One can imagine Honest Abe as an oracle, a speaker for the dead, a horrifically imperfect modern day Osiris.

Addition, Nov. 5 2018: After talking to my father, I feel like it’s important to remark (somewhat obviously) that this would have happened before the passing of the twenty-second amendment in 1947, so it would be highly unlikely that Lincoln would be out of the presidency any time soon. In this timeline, America likely becomes a theocracy for the remainder of its existence as a unified federal state, before fragmenting into a variety of separate states. Also, he remarked that this idea would make the absolute best big bad for a grimdark realist re-imagining of Wild Wild West. Let’s just pretend that the 1999 version never happened.

Notes on Operational Metaphysics by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Adam Fairhall - Arabian FantasyЛенинград ft. Глюк'oZa (ft. ST) Жу-Жу, Kanye West - Ghost Town, Richard Birkin - Vigil II >

Metaphysics is a filthy word. Not inherently, I don't mean to suggest that metaphysics is itself filth. Rather, it has been sufficiently degraded by its proximity to filth through the idle leisure of the theory class. This leisure was largely a prosocial activity when metaphysics was the domain of academic and/or priestly brahmin, operating within the confines of a system of social pressure demanding mathematical and philosophical rigor, but over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries metaphysics was often exported from those temples and universities into democratic contexts that it had no non-coercive use within. The popularization of dissociative metaphysics and, in tandem, the rise of naive rationalism have produced a general population with extreme blindspots concerning the architecture of any given cognitive process.

Since time immemorial, there have been many attempts to use metaphysical justification as a method of confounding the senses and passions into the anesthesia of solipsism. Perhaps the strongest contemporary tool in the arsenal of the solipsist is the ability to invoke quantum physics to give a sense of pseudoscientific legitimacy the claim of psychic causality. The fallacy of psychic causality can be specified as the belief that mental states can affect the world when the content of said mental states cannot be channeled through physical action on the substrate of the world. While I believe that, for instance, Schoppenhauer's interpretation of Gautama is philosophically sound, the same cannot be said for Deepak Chopra's superficially similar claim that the world is "made of consciousness." He and, for instance, Charles Eisenstein, should be categorized in the same unit as Rhonda Byrne, the author of The Secret. Metaphysics has become popular shorthand for the art of marketing lotus eating as something intellectually prestigious while conflating dissociation with philosophy. Another basic strand of New Age "metaphysical" thinking is the conflation of metaphysics with the "meaning" of reality, a belief which at least implicitly implies that there is a perspective external to and surveiling the self, interpreting the actions taken by the self. While indeed this may be a valid interpretation of the world and there certainly is a valid metaphysics for operating within this kind ontology, it artificially prunes the possible ontologies that an individual could consider themselves to exist within to those that are tacitly theistic.

These confusions have unfortunately shifted the metaphysics of a significant amount of the population such that they believe that they do not in fact have a metaphysical position. This has rendered the deepest conscious level of the psychological stack invisible, forcing one to model the mind's thought process as beginning with epistemology, rather than beginning with metaphysics. Though the Popperian empiricist perspective taken by the majority of the sane world is logically sound internally to itself, it is fails to describe how such a unit must be loaded into a larger apparatus as a component part. In order to take the perspective that probabilistic empiricism is correct, one must have already taken the perspective that the abstract values of reason, statistics, and observation are themselves valid. Aristotle did not reject Plato's rationalism, he simply placed empiricism as a valid partner alongside it by choosing to trust his senses instead of rejecting them—a position we must understood as informed by a likely period of considering the position of rejecting the senses, supposedly commonplace among the Athenians at the time. The act of marking a type of information significant is a metaphysical value judgement about what reality is, which is to say which parts of phenomenology can be understood to be consequential. The judgement to begin an empiricist endeavor is first dependent on a metaphysics, even if the empiricist endeavor then feeds back on the metaphysics that created it in the first place, updating the conception of valid information from phenomenological impressions. 

Though I have not become a proper scholar of his work, I am fairly sure that I am simply retelling the work of David Hume in a personal context. I am not interested in figuring out which of these ideas are mind and which are his, if he was in my place I would hope he would do the same thing and avoid the academic citation war and instead focus on the ways that metaphysics is not entitled navel gazing. Hume's position, reliably, is that of a man who has not been broken by coercive circumstances, and who has not been coddled and thus understands himself to be a finite being with finite capacities for knowledge. Instead of attempting to figure out how much I am channeling his ghost, I want to discuss the distinction between the positions of David Hume and Martin Heidegger, the man of principled custom and the man of dasein. 

Hume knew that it was correct to lean on our accumulated knowledge about the world even if we knew in our hearts that no matter how much analytical knowledge we produced we could not rely on it as evidence that the world was somehow predictable. The fundamental physical constants could lose their relationship to one another, and in doing so the whole world would unravel. (I do not suggest that the individual values of each constant varying would cause a problem, as if motion is relative the forces of each constant varying as a whole, but preserving the same relative strengths to one another would, I think, likely do nothing noticeable to the universe.) Still, we had to retain faith in our ability to discern cause and effect and treat that knowledge as dependable, if potentially badly motivated viziers. Custom is a good guide, even if at any moment our entire frame of reference might be incorrect, and we may find ourselves awake and alone in a sea of unpredictability. The key thing that Hume knows, is that custom must be tempered with humility. We must remember that the Socratic maxim that, in fact, we do not know anything is still true. No matter how much of the map we fill in, it still can never be the territory. This is not something that I think Martin Heidegger ever knew. 

If the subjects of philosophy are ourselves as Heidegger believed, then it is potentially correct to embrace solipsism as we cannot prove that there is something other than ourselves that we are studying. I think this is the central message of Being and Time, both in the medium/style/metadata of the book's format and the text itself. The book's obtuse structure causes the reader to experience cognitive dissonance and come to think that there is more to the philosophy contained within than there actually is. It would be, I think, far more correct to simply embrace the anarchic egoism of Stirner than to try and parse through Heidegger; the end result is the same, and Stirner is far more honest about what he believes. For, to Stirner, the best thing to be was an honest solipsist and to embrace the drives of the individual as they are the only things that can be verified. Heidegger cannot bring himself to admit that he is only a solipsist embracing meta-nationalism as he lacks the introspection to see that he is pacing the walls of a prison of himself, hoping that something will change.

If we are attempting to be authentically who we are in the present moment then we imprison ourselves in the state of mind that we have already been. We may narratize it as a style of being, a certain pattern of being-in-the-world, but it is still an inability to act in time, to coordinate with our future selves and even with the potential of being informed by the actions of our past selves. Mill wrote that it was wrong to sell oneself into slavery, and as such it is also incorrect for one to be attached to a present identity, for a future identity may take the place of the present and one may be better for it, how could you know except from the point in time where the choice is relevant? 

Heidegger makes the same mistake as popular Popperianism, but in reverse. He focuses on the sense of being, deriding the potential of mapmaking as mere techne, mere "enframing" of the world into something that lacks the possibility of the naive will. Popular Popperianism sacrificed the experience of the territory for the power of the map. Heidegger sacrificed the knowledge of the map for the power of the territory alone. It is a good way to coordinate with clones of yourself, to mass great forces of self-similar agents who think that they have access to the thing-in-itself to the degree that they can be themselves, for they are in contact with the only reality that they can know to be there under their metaphysics. But this is a poor epistemology with a rich metaphysics, leaving men like Otto Hahn crying out that there is something that has been overlooked to disastrous effect by both the Popular Popperians and the Daseinbots.

As an aside, I believe that a similar conflict to the one that I am trying to address with Heidegger and Hume appeared much more directly between Noam Chomsky and B.F. Skinner in the postwar period, but the details of that conflict are likely best left for a different discussion, but to begin I would recommend looking at Chomsky's Language and Mind, and Skinner's Verbal Behavior. 

For the Edinburgh Group, and for F. L, a man who gave me the gift of some wrong answers to all the right questions.

On Geopolitical Domination As A Service by Bryce Hidysmith

 America makes the best Muppet State.&nbsp;

America makes the best Muppet State. 

< Soundtrack: Nils Frahm - #2 / All Melody

[Epistemic status: borderline conspiracy theory, some slight additions May 1st, 2018, with thanks to J. O. & S. B.]

Update: Tuesday, June 12th, 2018:

After the Trump-Kim summit, it seems as though there are two pieces of information that are worth noting. Trump's remarks after the North Korea summit are already highly illuminating, and one of the major things I have to demand of my readers and colleagues is a focus on primary sources. The fact that Trump openly admitted that he was willing to engage in retroactive continuity in the speech is a remarkable testament to the fact that he is both willing to serve the role described below, and knows that this is his role in the improv game that he's playing, switching between ironic and unironic strategies rapidly. Would highly recommend Keith Johnstone's Impro as a guide to the sort of psychological state that enables Trump's strategy. One of the major questions is whether or not this imrpo/kayfabe mentality is able to transition into something that's able to close deals that ground in physical reality, or is it always pulling its punches to avoid expending too much effort.  Right now, the agreement has created an equilibrium state in social reality that allows Trump and Kim both sufficient plausible defensibility within their respective cults of personality that they can take potentially risky actions. The opposition to the deal previously made such risky actions fundamentally a social capital drain for Trump, especially when dealing with Democratic-aligned elements in the USA. If forward momentum from this initial action in social reality is maintained, moving into physical reality, the social capital drain tactic will no longer work against him, leading to as situation where full forward momentum is possible.

The fact that Kim flew into the summit on a Chinese plane is a major detail as it relates to continuity since events that I mentioned regarding 2013. Given that Xi assumed all of his current positions in 2012-2013, it's plausible that this is just a sign that Xi is supporting the hypothetical Kim Dynastic position as opposed to the Sungun position, as described below. This also important information that relates to how close Kim actually is to the military, given that the military did not seem to attempt a coup when he left the country. Kim may have successfully centralized power more than I previously thought, which removes most of his motivation to fold the regime and instead just points towards trying to extract concessions from the United States. If Bolton is still involved after the "Libya-model" goof, it's likely that he can be shamed into supporting concessions in a way that other possible National Security Advisors wouldn't be. This would be the worst outcome for NK, USA, and the world at large.

Also, just watch Dennis Rodman talk on CNN.

Original Post:

I just work up to the Korean War hopefully ending with the Panmunjom Declaration. This new era begins with a formerly unthinkable gesture: the two leaders of two states in a single country stepping across the border and back with wonderful hesitation. If the summit looked like it was all on script, I wouldn’t have trusted it. If the two leaders had automated away all of the unpredictable intimacy, there’s now way their hearts would be committed to peace. While there is an entirely different narrative that take the perspective of South Korean leaders attempting to reorganize the country in the wake of the impeachment of President Park in 2017, it seems more important to focus on analyzing the North Korean strategy at the moment. However, I will begin with some discussion of Moon and his his positioning for requisite context, such that I can begin the process of speculating on the contents of the Black Box that is the DPRK. 

The main important factor in the South’s behavior is the fact that Moon is willing and able to reconcile with the North, whereas neither Park nor her father ever had such an intention. A good place to start looking into Moon‘s deeds is this article from last year, which reported Moon’s pledge that there would be no unilateral military actions on the Korean Peninsula committed by Southern forces. Moon was playing an endurance game after assuming office. He needed to maintain open arms ready for reunification, while also simultaneously maintaining military superiority in the South Korea-United States alliance. One can think of Moon’s strategy as similar to maintaining an uncomfortable yoga position for a long time: at once at peace, ready for reconciliation, and superior in military might. Under Moon, South Korea was able to rest in a pose of martial vigilance. Given the fact that the antecedent president to Moon was Park Gyun-hye the daughter of a notorious autocrat Park Chung-hee, Moon was the first president of South Korea that was able to plausible communicate this stance to the DPRK leadership, as until now the militarist elements of the Park autocracy were too strong for the south to plausibly commit to peace.

This is impressive and not terribly obfuscated, in utter contrast to the North’s behavior. To begin looking at Kim Jong-un’s strategy, I want to look at two quotes. First, from The Straits Times, itself quoting Kim Jong-un’s announcement that he was ready to halt nuclear tests and ICBM launches. It’s worth making sure that you have the exact (translated) words that Kim Jong-un said before we go into commentary. Specifically, I want to make sure that the phrase “The struggle of the Korean people who worked hard with their belt tightened to acquire a powerful treasured sword for defending peace was successfully concluded,” is fresh in your memory. Think about the wording outside the context of history, as though it were just extremely literal remarks about the structure of the world.

And, the second quote: Mohammad Javad Zarif recently said that, for President Macron and Chancellor Merkel “to try to appease the president (Donald Trump) would be an exercise in futility.” Try the same literal reading, as you did with the Kim quote. Try to picture a world of political communication that isn’t primarily dominated by a sense of ironic detachment from the state of the world. Imagine that one is not avoidant of consequence, or anxious about outcomes, but rather that one is attached to a concrete set of goals and objectives. America, especially Coastal America where I live, tends to forget that politics is not simply a game people play for fun. The last year of Korean history makes a great deal more if one thinks that Kim Jong-un is a man who has in fact channeled his will towards an objective of finally ending the conflict of 1953 and moving towards a unified Korea. Bizarrely, it seems as though he has done this through the normally unforgivable strategy of nuclear blackmail, likely developing a coherent strategy between 2013 and 2016.  

I must conjecture that, at least from the perspective of Kim Jong-un, impossibility of Trump’s appeasement may be a feature, rather than a bug. Like any wild conjecture about current events, this is entirely speculative, but this is my best narrative about the state of play at the date of this article’s publication. I am by no means an expert on North Korea or Korean-American relations. I don’t speak or read Korean, and I haven’t studied the topic anywhere near as much as I would like to be confident in my views. This is a purely amateur exercise in analysis, and while it represents my best bets as to how this system of the world operates, I was meaningfully surprised enough times doing research on this in the last week that it would be unwise to endorse my perspective. I read about the Pyonyang University of Science and Technology today. The university an explicitly Christian organization with American ties sanctioned for operation in North Korea, a country which at least officially has implemented the Songbun class system, wherein one can easily be marked as a traitor for simply having Christian ministers as relatives. This is enough of a departure from the maximally limited view of the DPRK dominant in the American discourse to imply that such a view is as incomplete as the propagandistic, poverty concealing official narrative given to tour groups. My unknown unknowns must be assumed to be greater in relevance than any knowns. I haven’t fact-checked this as rigorously as I would like to, but give the timely nature of the topic it seems worth getting my basic model across. 

Still, I am writing this because I have seen no coherent model of Kim and Trump’s behavior on the English-language internet. The only discourse that I have seen is happening in private Neither the Blue or Red American factions — as described well in the Greenhall-notjafo Model — seem to be willing to consider the possibility. The Bluestate Ideology doesn’t want to think that Trump might not only be a Cold Warrior virulent in hatred the un-American, and thus cannot consider the prospect that Trump might actually be willing to resolve the North Korean conflict without maximal bloodshed. The Redstate Ideology is averse to the idea that Kim Jong-un might be anything other than an anti-American despot, and thus cannot model his interests outside of wishing to destroy the US. Both sides deny at least one relevant party the ability to speak in subtext. Minority Western political factions simply don’t have coherent narratives around international politics :  do the Identitarians think that North Korea has the right to determine its own destiny as an ethnostate? Does Social Justice imply that one should oppose imperialism at the expense of emboldening dictatorship? I have no idea, and the fact that I can’t think of a clear narrative for the stance of the alt-right or the alt-left points to their blessed irrelevance on the issue. 

Let’s ignore popular American political narratives for the moment; they prioritize agreement, and thus fail to depict a world as complex as reality must be. However, I need to speak to something that the popular narratives cover that I will largely not for the purposes of this essay. Most political commentary that is not directed solely to unelected policy professionals on some level attempts to describe first a political or ethical norm, asserts that the commentary is itself part of that norm, and uses this frame control to condemn behavior that is outside of the norm while speaking from a maximally defensible position. Such practices prohibit the revelation of surprising information exterior to individual narratives. Furthermore, despite the fact that there are certainly major unforgivable crimes committed by DPRK personal that require due process, I will largely avoid spending time trying to convince you that I believe that such crimes deserve condemnation. We know that violence is bad, and that the DPRK regime is founded on unthinkable acts of violence. I am choosing to focus on the command structure of the DPRK regime; this does not imply that I am somehow endorsing the regime or its effects. Trial in the court of public opinion is subverted, not bolstered, by telling the public who and what  to condemn rather than letting them see objective fact of right and wrong by their own eyes. This text—and ideally any others that I may be brave enough to write—will simply prioritize communicating a heterodox model without trying to assert the status of said model.  

I believe that both Trump and Kim are basing their strategies on illegibility to external interests. They are able to play into expected narratives, but don’t believe in the script anywhere as near as much as the other actors. This gives them ample room to deviate. Indeed, flagrant disregard for customary norms and social contracts has been the only method by which Trump has been able to effectively navigate the domestic American political environment. But let’s not focus on Trump too much. We know he believes in an ontologically basic deal, and focuses intently on the deal in front of him, attempting to pour all of his compute into winning individual zero sum dominance contests. Trump is the prioritization of the working memory over all other types of awareness, driven by aggression and an intense pride. There is no need for a better model of Trump; we can explain Kim’s strategy for Trump with only this cartoonish simplification. Whether or not Trump is engaging in it with ironic detachment, he’s successfully implemented the Madman Strategy that Nixon initially formulated. Kim understands that Trump will bet everything he has on his ability to win such a dominance contest. This seems to allow Kim to control Trump’s behavior to an oddly granular degree. It’s not without risks; Trump’s desire for ego-syntonic validation could flare up at any time and lead to a new war. 

Still, if Kim actually wanted a war, he would have started one by now. A critical mass of the North Korean military must be itching for a fight. As he is likely going against the military, it seems unlikely that Kim wanted a war in the first place. Beyond the evidence of his inaction, North Korea’s industrial capacity is declining. Their munitions are rusting. Their agricultural base is overtaxed. They have been weakened through sanctions for years, including recently from the PRC. There’s no way they would be able to survive a conflict with the United States without assistance from China or, to a lesser extent, Russia, and it’s implausible that either China or Russia would be able to benefit from such a conflict. If conflict was to escalate to a scale that could potentially lead to the debilitation of the United States, it would likely result in a bilateral nuclear exchange that would kill millions of people for no reason, likely containing almost the entire urban North Korean population. The only potential scenario I can imagine is if somehow North Korea and China both have a strong Marxist Internationalist hardline, but it’s highly unlikely that such internationalists would lack perception and pragmatism sufficient to reject a losing fight, and even more unlikely that they exist in the relevant decisive generations. It’s much more likely that China players are going to behave in a reasonable, self-interested way, noticing—rather obviously—that they have much to gain from avoiding a second Korean-American war. I would be much more worried about Russian or other nuclear interests attempting to use the DPRK as a pawn to provoke a war between the PRC and the USA, hoping that the two will exhaust their nuclear arsenals, leaving Moscow or another capital a singleton ICBM power. This plan is so high risk as to be almost deterministically suicidal, however. At the same time, North Korea has never acknowledged the end of the 1950-53 Korean-American war, and as such is positioned culturally, ideologically, economically, and strategically such that an eventual reignition of that conflict should be and is everyone’s null hypothesis, despite the fact that renewed hostilities is in no one’s interest. 

But, rather than attempting to win an impossible fight, what if Kim Jong-un simply wants to circumvent the entire war by simply folding instead of doubling down? Provided that one wants to fold to American power without having to fight directly, Trump’s tendency to be emotionally triggered and pursue geopolitical domination is potentially a very reliable service. Provided that Kim is not suicidal or implausibly ideologically hardline, this crisis might be solved without the use of machines for burning cities simply because its futile to appease Trump, and Kim has intentionally given himself this impossible task to be able to open negotiation with South Korea. Kim is not lying when he says that the nation no longer needs nuclear weapons; in fact they have already served their purpose by goading the Unites States and the international community into pressuring Kim to begin to fold at least part of his regime. Given the fact that Kim is not demanding the removal of American troops from the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for denuclearization, this seems like a reasonable null hypothesis. The assumption, generally is that Kim will never give up his nukes as they’re vital to the survival of his regime, citing the precedent of Muammar Gaddafi’s denuclearization of Libya. What if the survival of his regime is inessential—even detrimental—to his own survival? 

It is far easier to lose face in capitulation when the choice is between sudden death and prosperous life, rather than autonomy and subordination. The army of North Korea does not march overland much, but it certainly does stand guard on its stomach. In order for the North Korean economy to stabilize, it must demilitarize or integrate with the outside world, and likely both. Regardless of whether or not the claim that Kim’s recent commitment to shutter his main nuclear testing site was a move to ease tensions with the outside world, or driven by the mountain that contained the test site collapsing in on itself, as Wen Lianxing’s team at the University of Science and Technology of China in Hefei has conjectured, Kim’s contextualization of the shuttering of the test site seems best explained by this attempt to lose a negotiation with grace. Effective politics is almost always done through contextualization rather than action. Kim must be modeled as attempting to appeal to a probability space of possible relevant parties, engaging in strategic ambiguity so as to avoid being pinned down by one faction in his country as a member of another, hostile, faction. Unless the North Korean monarchy is implausibly absolute, we must model Kim as always at risk of looking like good prey for adventurist factions with much to gain and little to lose but their likely rather unpleasant lives. It's likely that Kim is far more personally threatened by elements in the North Korean civil service and military than South Koreans or Americans. 

My estimate is that Kim’s basic strategy was/is to continue the nuclear provocation until eventually the United States would be forced to send a senior diplomat—in this case Mike Pompeo completing a strategy likely set in motion by Rex Tillerson—to begin the process of brokering a deal between the two countries as sovereign powers. Kim needs North Korea to be able to operate as an autonomous state until he can guarantee his own safety, and potentially the safety of other individuals in his circle of concern—the exact side of which I am somewhat agnostic about given the lack of personal displays from Kim. Somatically, he seems to have a great deal more empathy in his eyes than his father or other high-ranking DPRK military or party personal, but this is of course a highly subjective intuitive judgement on my part. Potentially, the details of the eventual deal between Kim and the Americans are all worked out in advance, and the Trump-Kim summit next month is just a quick reality show.  Trump likely does not know this, but as Trump himself has said, “he’s not going to get played,” which is effectively code for Trump precommitting to not being surprised during the meeting. Provided that Kim has a clear picture of what Trump’s desires are, this means that the deal is as good as precommitted, even though it is likely not explicitly so.  Given the remarkably good outcome of the Kim-Moon summit, I am putting high likelihood on this outcome. Trump’s potential military aggression provided plausible deniability inside of the DPRK regime for Kim to begin the reintegration process by unifying Kim with the rest of the DPRK as they were all under the same American existential threat. 

Additionally, Kim has already successfully developed the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal to the point that it can legitimately threaten the United States, leading to a situation where the potential pre-commitments made by Pompeo cannot constrain Kim’s optionality to launch a first strike, giving Kim a decisive advantage that may be necessary when dealing with the US, a power that lacks the cultural unity and self-interest of South Korea. This potential for a first strike effectively ties Trump’s hands, provided that Trump is a sufficiently rational actor to abide by at least a minimax strategy—something that is remarkably debatable in light of recent threats to scrap Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal. By ensuring that the summit with Trump is to occur in person across the DMZ, Kim has the potential ability to save his own skin by defecting to the American side if somehow he is betrayed by ideological hardline interests inside his own country. This is likely unnecessary, and the logistics of this would be extremely difficult, but not inconceivable, and this additional strategy would simply be an additional security policy. There is also, of course, a profit motive on top of existential threats. Jyong Se-hyun, speaking to the South China Morning Post, noted that Kim Jong-un could potentially make a play to open the country up to foreign investment and copy the same strategy as Deng Xiaoping, while being able to take all of the credit for the accompanying prosperity with his already mature personality cult. Under this model, reunification is unlikely, but denuclearization and a formal termination of the 1950-53 war leading to closer relations and potentially eventual freedom of movement between the two Korean territories while Kim is able to successfully trade on maintaining the DPRK’s sovereignty while also simultaneously integrating the allegedly Marxist state into a global capitalist economy. I find the Deng possibility significantly more likely than a model that assumes Kim is running a strategy more similar to Gorbachov’s. 

All of this comes down to Kim and Trump’s psychology, and Kim is far more of a cipher than Trump. I must build a case to explain why Kim Jong-un wouldn’t want a war. I need to build a clear model of Kim’s environment, position, as well as his reactions to both. In order for my theory to make sense, Kim must have had a way to see that the DPRK as he inherited it was locked into a suicidal strategy. He must also have had a way to not personally identify with this suicidal strategy, leading to an attempt to leverage the regime’s own suicidality into the preservation of his life and the lives of others. Most tragically, a member of the Kim Dynasty or a major military leader giving enough of a damn to fold the regime is likely the world's best hope for a resolution to the ongoing conflict without a major attack on Seoul or another civic center outside of North Korea, in addition to large numbers of North Koreans dying in the accompanying invasion. Given the fact that the DPRK seems to effectively be a massive gulag, I see it as unlikely that strategies such as Kang Chol-hwan's media drops will be able to produce sufficient coordination within the territorial confines of the state. The center of power is not likely to shift from Kim or other members of the DPRK elite, leading to a situation where it is almost always better for individual citizens to defer gratification and gather resources, or attempt to escape the country, rather than building coordinated opposition interior to the country. Media drops are an extremely valuable method for easing the pain of future re-integration, but I see it as highly unlikely that they themselves are sufficient for developing a coordinated opposition inside of the state if dissidence is punished as severely as reports suggest. If there isn't a way to build an insurgency inside of the DPRK, then an attack would have to be spearheaded by an outside power, leading to a situation where the retaliatory capacity of the DPRK arsenal comes into play to terrible effect, at minimum killing millions in a localized war and potentially breaking out into a regional or global conflict. This creates a situation where the most effective plan is attempting to directly influence the present and future leaders of the country, thus potentially the best strategy is figuring out how to have Dennis Rodman bring his friends along with smuggling in information from the outside as in the Kang strategy, as other other options seem to reliably lead to at least one megacity being destroyed and the war environment selecting for further brutality, as in the case of the circumstances that led to Kim Il-sung rising to power in the first place. 

The rest of this document will be a historical analysis of Kim Jong-un’s position with ample digressions for context. However, if you already have a sufficient grasp of the topic that the above description makes sense intuitively, it might make more sense to just keep yourself glued to the news. I want to start this section with a story from “Kenji Fujimoto,” the pseudonymous Japanese personal chef of Kim Jong-il. “Fujimoto” stated in his account of his time as a servant of the Kims that Kim Jong-un remarked once: "We are here, playing basketball, riding horses, riding jet skis, having fun together. But what of the lives of the average people?” According to the article linked above, the quote has become a favorite of analysts, suggesting Kim’s isolation and potential leadership abilities, but I think it is perhaps a better example of the sort of naive rationality that might have not been beaten out of the boy by a fully militaristic education. Given the fact that Fujimoto apparently stopped working for Kim Jong-il in 2001, Jong-un would have been rather young at the time. The key question is whether or not he came to accept the hierarchy of the DPRK state as an ontological primitive, or if he managed to hold onto the basic naive rational assumption that the world can and should obey a basic ethical logic. 

So let's look at how that hierarchy works and how Kim fits into it. Firstly, need to establish that North Korea isn’t a fascist or a communist state, rather it is a semi-theocratic monarchy with the Kim family as divinely ordained by the revolution. The document Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System is perhaps the most direct evidence, with the ideological system in question being Juche, which I will cover in more detail below. It was originally proposed in the 1950s under Kim Il-Sung, but was later made official by Kim Jong-il in 1974 before being updated a number of subsequent times. In the version I’ve taken from the notes to Atsuhito Isozaki’s Understanding the North Korean Regime, Principle Ten states that: “We must pass down the great achievements of the Juche revolution and Songun revolution pioneered by Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung and led by comrades Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, inheriting and completing it to the end.” The term “pass down” is a method of legitimizing hereditary succession—fairly obvious when paired with the now normalized succession of Kims I-III. Furthermore, Principle Nine states “We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire Party, nation, and military move as one under the sole leadership of the Party.” Given that Principle Three is “We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung and comrade Kim Jong-il and the authority of the Party and defend it to death,” it’s fairly obvious that Principle Nine is establishing a clear chain of command for the tripartite state. The civilian Party and the military are directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader, who has been normalized to a hereditary member of the Kim family, appointed by the previous supreme leader, themselves definitionally born of the revolutionary bloodline.  

Given that North Korean philosophy dictionaries state that the Ten Principles are “The ideological system by which the whole party and people is firmly armed with the revolutionary ideology of the Suryeong (supreme leader) and united solidly around him, carrying out the revolutionary battle and construction battle under the sole leadership of the Suryeong,” and several sources I’ve found cite it as effectively supreme law in the country, it’s clear that the formal structure of the state as a monarchy is legible to the population. Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Yo-Jong was the delegate sent to South Korea for the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics where the Koreas sent a united team. This implies that the Kim Dynasty appears to be reasonably unified in activism to attempt to unify Korea. This is a radical departure from previous policies instanced by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and the fact that the policy change was possible without also delegitimizing the authority of the monarchy is notable. We must attempt to understand how Kim Jong-un came to power as hereditary supreme leader by understanding something of how the system that empowers himself came to be. The following descriptions of DPRK ideological concepts are attempts at discerning the literal content of documentation. Like any state religion, the interpretation of the literal content by living persons is obviously more strategically relevant than the letter of the law. However, Kim, by playing into the explicit narratives of his sovereignty, is likely able to exploit the fact that the North Korean state cannot verbally and directly oppose its foundational ideological principles. 

The role of the supreme leader is legitimized by Juche, the North Korean state ideology, which can be understood of as a radical idealist metaphysics. It can be loosely can be loosely translated as “Self-Reliance,” and is derived from the Japanese “Shutai,” a transliteration of Marx’s use of the German “Subjekt.” The word Subjekt is equivalent to its English cognate, as in subject-object relations. Kim Il-Sung, the founder of the North Korean state, outlined three principles of Juche in a 1965 speech: political independence, economic self-sustenance, and self-reliance in defense. However, the method for attaining this is mediated through the will of the Kim family, rather than through the acquisition of the means of production, allowing collective betterment as in orthodox Marxism. It’s a rather abstract book supporting an abstract ideology. 

To quote from the official English translation of On the Juche Idea: “As the leader said, the Juche idea is based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything.” Juche philosophy, thus, is idealist rather than materialist, and the overall state ideology asserts that the only way that the mass democratic movement is able to successfully gain sufficient power to attain the ideal sponsored by Juche is by the masses mediating their behavior through the idealized persons of the Kim dynasty. Quoting again from On the Juche Idea: “The leader [Kim Il-sung] gave a new philosophical conception of man by defining independence, creativity and consciousness as the essential features of man, the social being.” These traits are given by fiat, through the leader. This relationship is stated explicitly multiple times throughout the book, for instance here: “How the masses are awakened to consciousness and organized in a revolutionary way, and how they perform their revolutionary duties and historical mission, depend on whether or not they are given correct leadership by the party and the leader.” The masses may be able to reshape the world, for they are men, but they must be led in order to be effective at this objective. Self-reliance depends on a sovereign who is at once the general correlate of the regime’s success, and who is additionally separate from the regime. The Juche idea resembles Neoreaction far more than it does a reasonably functional socialist state trending towards full or even partial communism. Socialism or even potentially full communism is to be willed into existence by the supreme leader, but even while socialist or communist outcomes are potentially superior to other organizational systems in this model that values centralized coordination and the construction of an ordered anthropocentric world above all other things, the state of the world is seen as non-deterministically computed through the will of the sovereign. As with any monarchial system, the output is equal to the personality and skill of the individual implementing it, and as we can see from the reports of refugees from the prison camps, the first two Kims were certainly willing to use pure sadism as a tactic to reshape their society. 

It’s worth looking at the process that led to the end of a unified Korea to explain how this is an intuitive metaphysics to emerge in the North Korean context. When Kim Il-sung was born in 1912, Korea was a Japanese colony undergoing assimilation, but the Japanese occupation was hardly the beginning of Korea’s loss of autonomy as the native Korean monarchy was being intentionally subverted by virtually every great and regional imperial power active at the end of the nineteenth century. While the Korean Monarchy was already in the Qing sphere of influence as a tributary state, at least from my inexpert vantage, the point at which the Korean Monarchy became terminal was the assassination of Empress Myeongseong, orchestrated by the Japanese minister to Korea Miura Gorō. The assassination is the first point at which the Japanese Empire no longer had any plausible deniability as to its intentions in destroying Korean sovereignty. The assassination of Empress Myeongseong led to King Gojong and the crown prince governing from the Russian legation in Jeong-dong, as attempting to target them inside of the legation would be a direct act of war against Russia for the Japanese. This implies that from the perspective of the sovereign Gojong, the Korean state required protection from a superior military power to successfully maintain its existence. King Gojang’s decision as to which regionally interested power to collaborate with was forced, given the need for an expedient reaction to the Japanese threat, and given the fact that Korea was supposed to be officially independent because of a treaty that Qing Chinese representatives had signed guaranteeing Korea’s independence following the first Sino-Japanese War. The war, despite its name, had in fact broken out in Korea a mere year earlier and concluded just months before the assassination of the Empress, and which was prompted by Korea’s request for aid from the Qing in suppressing a Neo-Confucian peasant rebellion. Korea, by the end of the nineteenth century, was simply too small to assert its independence when surrounded by massive and aggressive neighbors. Japan, after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, was the unquestioned military power in the East Asian region, formally made Korea a protectorate, and had taken over police functions inside of Korea—an obvious symptom of total loss of independence. In 1910, Korea was officially annexed by Japan. Korea was forcibly mobilized as a Japanese colony through the World Wars. The Soviet Union officially declared war on the Japanese two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, leading to a rapid opportunistic advance by Soviet troops across the Korean peninsula while Soviet forces also attacked the Japanese regime in Manchuria. The Soviet-Japanese war lasted a grand total of three weeks and three days, and at its conclusion the Soviets accepted the American suggestion to divide Korea into separate American and Soviet sectors at the 38th parallel. The Moscow Conference of 1945 established that a joint commission of Britain, the U.S, the Soviets, and the PRC. were to attempt to establish a single free government in Korea. The British and the Chinese were unsurprisingly marginalized, and American and Soviet military occupations were established. Notably, they were given a budget of five years to hold a trusteeship over the country before independence could be established. Unsurprisingly, the War of 1950-53 started right on schedule.

If we focus back on the emergence of the Kim dynasty, we need to get a clear picture of the life and times of their founder and how his biography served as a legitimation of their claim to Juche. Enter Kim Il-Sung, born 15 April, 1912 Anno Domini, or Juche Year 1, depending on your messiah of choice. The story’s murky, but I’ll go through it best I can. He’s born in North Jeolla, in what would eventually become South Korea. He claimed to be raised Presbyterian, and his family ran to Manchuria in 1920, either to escape famine or persecution for resisting the Japanese occupation. By ’26 the kid is 14, and apparently founds something called the Down-With-Imperialism-Union that’s considered the predecessor to the Workers’ Party of Korea. Given the lack of information, I like to think that this is sort of like George Washington’s high school debate club being considered the direct successor organization to the US Congress, but Kim definitely joined the Chinese Communist Party (the Korean Communist Party had gotten kicked out of the Comintern for being too nationalist and thus wasn’t cool enough) and got to work as a member of various guerrilla warfare organizations attempting to damage the Japanese Regime. In 1931, this all got more difficult when the Japanese planted some dynamite on their own railroad tracks in what came to be known as the Mukden Incident and claimed it was Chinese dissidents, giving themselves an excuse to set up a puppet state in Manchuria. Some League of Nations investigators called the Lytton Commission figured out it was a false flag the next year, which led to them kicking Japan out of their club. It was during this period that Kim managed to have his first major early success: the raid on Pochonbo, where his gang attacked a small Japanese colonial village, making off with four thousand yen (apparently about 16,000 2015 USD according to a conversion at and burning down various municipal buildings, among them the police station, post office, foresters' office, local elementary school, and fire department. Reading accounts like this makes me realize just how much The Good, The Bad, & The Weird wasn’t exaggerating how much Japanese occupied Manchuria was effectively a Western, while also being narrated as being similarly heroic by the North Korean regime when, in actuality, it seems nasty, brutish, and depressingly small-time. 

The Japanese eventually chased him and his unit out of Korea, whereupon he apparently joined the Red Army and served until the end of World War Two, ending up back in Korea when the Soviets pushed south. Kim was now an experienced fighter living inside of Soviet Korea, one of the twentieth centuries greatest paradoxes: an almost honestly anti-imperialist colonial occupation. Kim was going to exploit this situation for all it was worth. Terentii Shtykov, the Soviet ambassador to Korea and the general in de facto command of the Soviet occupation due to his connections to Josef Stalin, appears to have supported Kim in his rise. While the party has now largely edited Shtykov out of history, he was in effect the DPRK’s first supreme leader. However, Kim Il-sung managed to successfully inherit the position of Sovereign from Shtykov and reassert the DPRK as an independent state rathe than simply a Soviet protectorate. Kim Il-sung used Shtykov’s connections to travel to Moscow in March of 1949 an attempt to persuade Stalin to allow him to begin military actions against the South. However, from an official (read: highly idealized) transcript of their conversation, Stalin ad Kim both agreed that the war was inevitable. Border clashes were already breaking out on the 38th Parallel, and guerrillas were already maintaining operations behind enemy lines. America often likes to pretend that there was not a direct line of conflict from the Second World War to the Cold War, but the conflict is one continuous mass of strategic actions, rather than two discrete periods of hostility. The Korean War is the only time that the great powers of the Cold War ever went head to head in any meaningful sense, with the United States engaging in combat with a pre-nuclear PRC. 

Stalin was not initially willing to authorize military action against the south, but the situation changed by the next year. A likely major persuasive force in this negotiation was the recent victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War, which certainly must have increased the strategic authority of East Asian guerrillas by a great deal. Stalin, for his part, was likely quite concerned that the Americans would attempt to remilitarize the Japanese, and use them to limit the Soviet Union’s Asian sphere of influence. Additionally, the Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb in August, 1949, breaking the American nuclear monopoly. The codes used to communicate with the American embassy in Moscow had also been cracked, leading to Stalin correctly assuming that Korea did not have the importance necessary to warrant a nuclear conflict. Kim Il-sung also seems to have directly lied to Stalin, as evidenced by an official Russian summary quoted on page ten of this linked document. Kim suggested that the war might be won by supporting already active elements behind enemy lines in about three days, and that the Americans wouldn’t be interested in intervening as the South Koreans would welcome their communist “liberators.” Given his wartime experiences, Kim cannot honestly have thought that Korea was ideologically unified enough to want to embrace a new communist government immediately, and I might have to conjecture that Kim was able to play Stalin by letting him oversimplify the Korean perspective. If Syngman Rhee was willing to massacre over 100,000 suspected political in his own country in one of many incidents to come, and still hold onto the South Korean presidency until 1960, Kim was either lying or implausibly fundamentalist in his Marxism. 

The critical thing to take away from all of these details is that Kim Il-sung correctly assessed the strategic landscape, noticing that his position in the world was to be canon fodder for the major powers of China and Russia against the major power of the United States and potentially relevant Japanese allies. By giving lip service to these power plays, he was able to deny the material reality of the war in order to make a direct claim to lead the necessary—potentially suicidal—resistance to the South’s expansion by leading a disposable buffer state. Kim's first steps at asserting Korea as an independent state came, again, under cover Stalin’s sphere of influence, allowing supposed loyalty to the overall Communist cause serve as a cover for Korean nationalism. Indeed, if Kim had not been able to begin the war on terms that clearly made him a client of the Soviets but reasonably independent, he would never have been able to get the assistance from the CCP or Moscow necessary to successfully maintain North Korea as an independent state. When Shtykov was dismissed following a poor military performance during earlier phases of the war, Kim Il-sung was able to exploit the chaos and take command of the government during the decisive phases of the war, most importantly the phases after the PRC directly sent some of its forces into the fight—the People’s Volunteer Army—following their conditional that if South Korean/American/United Nations troops crossed the 38th Parallel, they would entire the fray, tilting the odds in favor of the Communists and providing an environment within which Kim Il-Sung would be able to reliably gather moral authority. The 1950-53 Korean War Wikipedia page gives a pretty good picture of how absurd it is that North Korea survived the chaos of the war as a society at all:

Almost every substantial building in North Korea was destroyed as a result.[326][327] The war's highest-ranking U.S. POW, U.S. Major General William F. Dean,[328] reported that the majority of North Korean cities and villages he saw were either rubble or snow-covered wasteland.[329][330] North Korean factories, schools, hospitals, and government offices were forced to move underground, and air defenses were "non-existent."[325] In November 1950, the North Korean leadership instructed their population to build dugouts and mud huts and to dig underground tunnels, in order to solve the acute housing problem.[331] U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMaycommented, "we went over there and fought the war and eventually burned down every town in North Korea anyway, some way or another, and some in South Korea, too."[332] Pyongyang, which saw 75 percent of its area destroyed, was so devastated that bombing was halted as there were no longer any worthy targets.[333][334] On 28 November, Bomber Command reported on the campaign's progress: 95 percent of Manpojin was destroyed, along with 90 percent of Hoeryong, Namsi and Koindong, 85 percent of Chosan, 75 percent of both Sakchu and Huichon, and 20 percent of Uiju. According to USAF damage assessments, "eighteen of twenty-two major cities in North Korea had been at least half obliterated."[321] By the end of the campaign, US bombers had difficulty in finding targets and were reduced to bombing footbridges or jettisoning their bombs into the sea.[335]

Kim Il-sung’s draw against the Americans was an existence proof of Juche in practice. It’s hard to think of survival under these terms as anything other than a remarkable victory against every other country involved in the conflict. Kim managed to reassert North Koreas independence to the same degree as the Joseon, something unseen in living memory. The Juche idea is that survival might have been caused by his will, rather than in spite of it. Juche is dialectical idealism, rather than dialectical materialism, suggesting that as the Soviet and American materialist policy was defeated by the independence of Juche, ideals are stronger than matter. By embracing the Juche system and cutting the DPRK off from the world as the proverbial hermit kingdom, there were little or no attack vectors by which large countries could subvert Kim Il-sung’s sovereignty, leading to him focusing for the rest of his life on the consolidation of power within DPRK borders. 

Of course, Kim Jong-il wasn’t in the picture until comparatively recently, and because of the intricacy of these ideological systems I’ve had to address this entire set of topics more nonlinearly than may be comfortable for some readers. The vast majority of this ideological system was in play by the time that he reached adulthood, and it was not he who was the heir apparent to the chair of the party, but rather his half-brother, the now-assassinated Kim Jong-nam. Little is known about Kim Jong-un’s early life, but by far the likeliest story is that he was educated in Switzerland at English language schools under pseudonyms during the span of the 1990s. He was apparently a quiet child, interested in basketball and under the watch of a bodyguard masquerading as another student. In 2000, he abruptly returned to North Korea and likely attending Kim Il-sung University for a degree in physics, as well as Kim Il-sung military university for officer training. This was shortly before Kim Jong-nam was arrested for attempting to go to Tokyo Disneyland under a false passport in 2001, so potentially his acting out was symptomatic of already having been delegitimized by his father and other stakeholders in the regime, leading to the likely reality that Kim’s recall in 2000 was timed so as to prepare him as a backup heir. Kim Jong-nam himself claimed in 2012 that his father had reacted poorly to his changes from his time overseas, and thus terminated his siblings time outside the country. One might imagine that Kim Jong-nam simply stopped attempting to be a good heir around that time, leading to increasingly self-defeating behavior as his removal from dynastic power was already determined.

The medieval Arab sociologist Ibn Khaldun, in the Muqaddimah, made the point that states founded by formerly nomadic conquerers tend to follow a three-generation pattern. The first generation are conquerers who begin the dynasty, who were hard enough men to conquer settled peoples. Their children are raised by the conquering (or in North Korean terms revolutionary) dynasty, who train their direct descendants to imitate themselves properly. Then, the third generation, raised in the state’s prime, is frequently raised in the luxury of a golden age and fails to maintain the harsh standards of their nomadic ancestors. From the perspective of maintaining an independent state, Kim’s likely lavish upbringing is a strategic disaster. However, from the perspective of folding the state with an ethical mind, it potentially produced a sensitive individual with intense personal preference that he assumes is not inherently evil, as well as perceptive abilities that are able to react to the kinds of threats inherent in a life of palace intrigue. A former classmate of his remarked that he spent a great deal of time in school in Switzerland drawing detailed pencil drawings of Michael Jordan for hours. This kind of self-directed, contemplative behavior was likely upset when he was sent to the military university and rejoined palace society. This breach of social contract may have provided a healthy degree of paranoia while leaving his perspective primary in his own ontology, as opposed to filtering his assumptions of right and wrong through an authority figure. In short, I think that Kim Jong-un may in fact retain a conception of justice, even if it is an alien justice to my norms. We can either interpret Kim Jong-un’s reactions to the circumstances of power that were thrust on him as opportunistic hedonism, but this is an entirely implausible idea given the fact that he has begun the process of giving up his asymmetric leverage by meeting with Moon. Instead, it seems like the only real option is to think that Kim, after being brought back into the palatial fold, maintained a strategic will and a desire to reconcile the contradictions in his life, simply waiting for an opportunity to run a strategy such as the one that is currently playing out. I am not suggesting that somehow this was a masterplan designed to the letter in advance, rather that it seems more likely that Kim Jong-un has been observing a set of heuristics that led him to take opportunities that could lead to this de-escalation of tensions, if only because this would grant him more autonomy and less psychological pain from causing the suffering of others in the long run. His father, Jong-il, certainly did not take such opportunities, and instead simply engaged in private cruelties. Kim Jong-il played the role that was expected of him, whereas Kim Jong-un seems to have held onto an independent mentality, separate from the will of the crowd. 

I have been somewhat intentionally leaving out the other major narrative of North Korean ideology as it does not seem to have come into play anywhere near as strongly until the reign of Kim Jong-il There is a second narrative other than Juche in play in the interpretation of the 1950 War: Songun, or “military first" which you might have noticed as an untranslated term in the above quotes from the Ten Principles. Songun means that after the revolution is completed—something that the North Korean state seems to waffle about a great deal—the process of constructing a new society begins with the military, asserting that the military is the primary source of power in the country. Far more than Prussia ever was, North Korea is a military with a country, where the military is given first priority in everything from information to food. It’s a much simpler idea than the metaphysics of Juche, but in effect its equally as important to the country’s positioning even though I don’t find it terribly compelling. However, it's important to note that Songun didn’t appear as official government doctrine until after the death of Kim Il-Sung. The country was certainly militarized due to situational need, but the military was not given official status to the same degree as party ideology and the Kim Il-sung cult of personality. I conjecture that Songun as an ideological system is an attempt to claim that the Korean People’s Army is the source of ideological legitimacy, rather than the Kim bloodline, as an effort to create a military junta external to the monarchy. In such a position, an individual or set of generals would be able to depose or puppet the monarch and govern from a position of relative security. Songun, as a narrative, has been an attempt to describe the origins of the North Korean State in terms of the anti-Japanese Occupation forces that Kim fought with, rather than Kim specifically, positioning the military as an elite force, able to compete as a separate sovereign to the Revolutionary Bloodline. Ironically, I must note that Kim Il-sung may have attempted the same strategy as his son, attempting to pursue nuclear development in the 1990s, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction potentially providing the plausible deniability to talk with Jimmy Carter in 1994. Kim Il-sung’s death on July 8th of that year is potentially suspicious, but as was 82 at the time this is not terribly suspicious, additionally as nuclear weapons were not pursued following Kim's death until 2006. 

The more I look into this, the more that it seems that Kim Jong-un was intentionally eliminating all threats to his personal rule from the first days of his administration. He inaugurated a “Day of Songun” in 2013, while also keeping his birthday off of the Revolutionary Calendar, seemingly managing to create a holiday associated with him while also giving lip service to the Songun ideology. However, a more interesting element of Kim Jong-un’s purging of his uncle-in-law, Jang Song-thaek in 2013 as a counter-revolutionary. Jang appears to have taken a great deal of de facto control over the country during the decline of Kim Jong-il’s health, while also maintaining a strong relationship with the military. Jang had been communicating directly with the highest levels of the Chinese state, seeming to hopefully create a stronger relationship there. Kim Jong-un’s half brother, Kim Jong-nam himself stated that he was living under Chinese protection, strengthening the idea that this was an attempt to remove Jong-un from power and reposition the country as a junta-led client state for Beijing. Given the fact that he had a relatively legitimate claim to the title of supreme leader, and was clearly inside of the PRC’s sphere of influence, it is not surprising that the DPRK eventually managed to have him assassinated in 2017 using the bizarre method of two women, one wearing a “LOL” shirt, delivered a VX nerve agent, both of whom claimed to think they were filming a prank video for the Chinese market, the flagrant subtext of which may just be my apopheia acting up. Under the internal logic of the feudalist state, Kim Jong-nam was a pawn that could easily be transformed into a claimant the throne, and by primogeniture could easily be used to unseat Kim if elements internal to the DPRK coordinated with outside support. It is difficult to think about the unkindness of feudal politics from a secular, republican vantage, but it is necessary to note that from the vantage of most systems of succession, it is Jong-un who is the pretender, not Jong-nam. 

Quoting again from Isozaki: 

At the Third Congress of the WPK in September 2010, at which Kim Jong-un appeared in public as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the WPK Charter was revised for the first time in 30 years. At the time, North Korea only released the Preamble to the Charter, and it showed the terms “Songun politics” and “Songun revolution” as being newly incorporated into the Charter whereas the term “communist ideology” had been deleted. It was inferred The Structure of the North Korean Regime 21 that the Charter had been revised in preparation for the transition of power from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. This method of making necessary revisions to the Charter varied from the way in which the regime handled the succession of power by Kim Jong-il after the death of Kim Il-sung. This process-oriented style of legitimization is one of the characteristics of the regime in the Kim Jong-un era.” 

The military was setting itself up as an intermediary between the official ideology and the monarchy. One could easily interpret this as the military attempting to strengthen their position to oppose the Kim Dynasty. A more charitable interpretation is a desire to use the military to assert independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, either by attempting to directly enter the Chinese sphere of influence or by maintaining a domestic military buildup. Nuclear weaponry, bizarrely, seems to have served the purpose of actually being the sword by which Kim defended peace by avoiding giving the military control of the country. Such military control would have likely ceded Korean autonomy to the Chinese or potentially provoking a war with the Americans, whereas maintaining the monarchy would have let Korea retain its independence by being incompatible with ether the PRC or USA operating system. This would be the obvious strategy that would preserve the position of the military by ceding control to the Chinese sphere of influence, and given that broadcasts such as this one were being aired in 2013, it seems rather likely that the military was pressing for a war independent of the monarchy. Such a war would provide a plausible excuse for a coup, as the military itself had a stronger tie to the revolution’s practical skills than the as-yet-untested Kim Jong-un. While it doesn’t exactly mean anything concrete, the DPRK did indeed declare a “state of war” in March of 2013, along with threatening a nuclear first strike ambiguously against US/SK targets. Pursuing autonomous nuclear development at the expense of relations with great power states managed to produce a scenario where Kim was still clearly the sovereign, and North Korea was still clearly an independent state. Kim Jong-un did not start the North Korean nuclear program, he simply appropriated it at an opportune time as it was the only policy that wold maintain his autonomy, and also be able to be communicated internally to the Party and Military as a pursuit of both Juche and Songun. Beyond this example, I am sure that there are other threats that Kim Jong-un neutralized to his personal rule, this one just seems more obvious than most, and bizarrely the official narrative that Jang was in fact a traitor makes sense on the grounds that Jang was in a position where treachery to the DPRK regime would have let him personally profit. It's also worth noting that Jang’s apparent strategy of using Kim Jong-nam as a pawn while also selling out to the Chinese is not a remotely insane plan for trying to either survive as an individual, nor an insane plan for maximizing the number of Korean citizens who survive and prosper. It’s also worth noting that I don’t actually believe that Kim Jong-un had the foresight to really think through the implications of neutralizing the threat of Jang and focusing on nuclear development. Its far more likely that he was just trying to preserve his own freedom of action, and managed to notice a specific strategy to optimize for that in relation to Trump. In a way, it doesn’t matter if it was intentional or not, just whether or not Kim was able to execute the strategy.  

If we want to try to analyze this chronologically, North Korea in 2013 was ready to go to war March. Tensions increased at least until the end of May, as the DPRK continued engaging in missile tests, until by June the pattern abruptly halted and they reached out to begin conversation with South Korea concerning the Kaesong Industrial Region. By the summer, the Pyongyang-Seoul hotline was restored, and the two Koreas were able to talk to one another again, instead of the North intentionally avoiding communication to increase the likelihood of a conflict. I would conjecture that this shows that the Jang rebellion had failed by the summer. Jang himself was executed in December as a denouement to the likely attempted coup. Kim Jong-un seemed to go through a long period of dormancy after that, including a three week period of absence from public life in September of 2014. The next year, Kim made the bold and unsubstantiated claim that he had a thermonuclear bomb, along with pictures that clearly did not show a hydrogen bomb in 2016. The nuclear testing resumed in earnest in 2017, perhaps in anticipation of the termination of the Pax Obama. The election of Donald Trump was sufficiently unexpected that the opportunity could likely have not been predicted, but the need for more military buildup in light of a likely more aggressive American government under the American Republicans or Clinton would be sufficient cause for Kim to think that it was necessary. Trump’s election was a godsend, then. One imagines Kim experiencing a sudden breather, where the palace intrigue has finally calmed down, and there are no obvious threats besides a bellicose American “dotard” who can provide a much needed narrative to keep internal DPRK coordination up, while pursuing diplomatic efforts to align with the south simultaneously, most obviously through Kim Yo-Jong’s attendance of the 2018 Seoul Winter Olympics. Thus, I think Kim pursued the Geopolitical Domination as a Service plan once it was clear that Trump was predictable. 

I feel a strong need to not obfuscate the level of brutality that was present in the neutralization of this plot. One of Jang’s cronies, the deputy security minister O Sang-hon, was burned alive by Kim's regime. I am stuck trying to analyze these chapters in world history like a good utilitarian, trying to discern whether it was right to burn one man to set an example in order to avoid burning Seoul. The weighing of homicides against urbicides simply illustrates the type of ethical quandary at hand. If one inherits the throne of a sadistic prison state, thus also possessing the opportunity of dismantling it only if one plays along for a great deal of time, is the ethical thing to do to engage in a deferred gratification strategy and become the local power through any means necessary, before implementing something in line with your values? How can Kim have accomplished this without becoming the character he's played so well? If Kim is acting out of an ethical imperative, how does he remember it when there is no way that he could hold himself to such a standard reliably? Kim Jong-un may be the most effective Wallfacer that the twenty-first century has seen thus far, complete with the curse that he will never be truly trusted as he must always hide something. He must always maintain plausible deniability that he is acting in all relevant narratives until the decisive moment when he can limit his optionality to the one thing he always seemed to have wanted: survival, at least for himself, and I hope for others. The troublesome thing is that until the process of peace and reconciliation continues further, everyone must take Kim’s actions almost entirely on faith. His behavior is necessary, but not remotely sufficient to prove the hypothesis I’ve presented here. However, if one day Moon and Kim can speak freely, perhaps the whole exhausting story can come to light. Then this hypothesis can be put to the test.

Five Statuses Under Rule Of Law by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Anika - I Go To Sleep >

While wandering around MAAM with one I. Z. last month, I think I managed to formulate a pretty clear idea of the kinds of statuses that any individual could have in relation to a code of law. We have to begin with the assumption that individuals choose to follow codes of law because they believe in the validity of the code to produce beneficial outcomes, and have thus chosen to have the law code run some of their behavior. This is true even in cases where individuals are compelled to follow the law by force, as the other outcome in their mind is oblivion, and they have not chosen to embrace the potentially suicidal radical freedom of their situation. Of course, there are several other political systems that are not codes of law (although, of course, they could masquerade as codes of law.) Among them are the meritocracy of violence, common law, fascism and other centralized police models, Girardian mimesis, stigmergic blockchainified anarchy, and so on, appearing usually in blended formats.

A law, in the sense that I'm attempting to use it here, is the notion that an action must follow a condition. The water will certainly wet us, the fire will certainly burn, and thus it is most critical to institute policies that build on such natural laws to produce anthropically beneficial outcomes. Such a human generated law should be understood to be a response demanded by a condition, where any other action that that demanded by the condition is to be understood to be illegal, with varying specific punishments defined internally to the code of law as specified recourse against illegal actions. While I will make no claim as to the content of such code of law for the moment, the following statuses only make sense with this invariant and procedural notion of what law is. To accept a law such as this, one accepts the understanding that certain, specific action is demanded of them by specific conditions, and that to not take such action risks dishonor and incoherence of action and thought. One would lose one's community identity if one did not follow this code of law, which is what is usually phrased as dishonor. This sense of honor is, in effect, the knowledge of other parties that one is living up to the standard of the law, and that the identity generated by living up to that standard has subjective value by the community that would otherwise be absent. Law, in this sense, is no so different from a religion or a culture, provided that such a religion or culture actually demands specific actions by its members. The vast majority of these systems are implicit, rather than explicit, for instance I don't think anyone's written down an orthodox text on exactly how to "be macho." However, that illiterate storage mechanism doesn't change the mechanics in play, as the law is still executed with an assumption of common knowledge as to its content. Additionally, it doesn't matter if the entire code of law is stored in any individual who is attempting to act by it—rather obviously laws  could demand a consultation by a judge, shaman, sage, or other superior for a ruling. The five statuses, which I believe to be conditionally exhaustive given this idea of common knowledge of the content of the law, are the following: 

The Enemy: Toxic to the identity that accepts the code as valid behavior. This is to say, this type of organism is either fundamentally parasitic, predatory, or sadistic against the identity that accepts the code of law. This means that those individuals who have chosen the identity of following the law have to understand that these organisms are not only outlaws, but enemies of the law itself by targeting those who have chosen to embrace it for expropration. Because these organisms constitute an existential threat, they would have to be neutralized directly by whatever strategy would render them irrelevant. 

The Silent Majority of the Irrelevant: Relatively self-explanatory. There may be a great mass of organisms that simply do not interact with the citizenry directly enough to demand any specific policy. One of the hard things about defining this population is that if they produce negative externalities to a sufficient degree, they effectively become The Enemy. Provided their aggregate output is sufficiently non-toxic, its safe and indeed ethically mandated to simply ignore them. An interesting note is that the ethical mandate is likely both a self-interested one, and one that recognizes the Irrelevant as moral patients, as it is likely that the Irrelevant are somehow globally relevant, while being locally irrelevant, insofar as they constitute a part of the overall ecosystem that generates the individuals who have chosen to embrace the law-code, and thus disturbing the inputs of that ecosystem is disadvantageous.  

The Trade Partners: There are likely a great many organisms that follow other codes of law (or, in fact, no code of law besides perhaps naked self interest) that members of the law code could easily exchange material with in a mutually beneficial, positive-sum manner. These count as trade partners. The individual under the code of law does not identify with them, but wants good things to happen with them in an abstract way and wants to develop whatever symbioses can be developed as long as they don't undermine the individual's identity or livelihood. The lawful accept a fundamentally alien character of the trade partners, but there is no reason to think that their alien character is offensive or dangerous, just different. 

Children, Invalids, Aspirants: There are of course a great many individuals inside a given community who are not sufficiently responsible for their actions to be considered full citizens under the law, and instead must be considered defendants to the body of Active Citizens. The exact way that they are organized is up for sufficient debate, but it seems likely that there needs to be a distinction between those who are temporarily irresponsible (such as a child or a immigrating convert who has not been sufficiently educated to be able to act within the protocol of laws and understand the implications of all of their actions), and permanently irresponsible (such as those with extreme developmental disabilities). Critically, these are populations that must be given the utmost compassion, as by interfacing with them at all the body of Active Citizens would at least implicitly recognize that they are no longer independent. 

The Active Citizens: Those that share the same code of law and honor as the individual whose perspective we are taking. This is to say, a population who has chosen to take a set of bonds to make themselves more free as a community. Again, the exact nature of these bonds does not need to be specified, but consensus on a given currency, a given health code, collective sponsorship of institutions such as schools or transit networks, the agreement that there should be a method of recourse for those who have been assaulted is an obvious set of starting points for the basic functionality of a liberal community. 

Newcomb's Paradox, The Cynics, & The Hungry Crowd by Bryce Hidysmith

 Photo by T. Sullivan, San Francisco, March, 2018

Photo by T. Sullivan, San Francisco, March, 2018

< Soundtrack: Just keep reading, but also Albinoni - Adagio in G Minor and Zola Jesus/JG Thirlwell/Mivos Quartet - Hikikomori >


I'm on an overnight ferry crossing the Baltic, trying to grapple with Robert Nozick's Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice. I highly suggest reading Nozick’s original article, and there are plenty of available summaries of Newcomb’s Problem and commentaries on its implications—a recent favorite of mine is Scott Aaronson’s remarks in Quantum Computing Since Democritus, especially his remarks on the student with a 50% rating on the Aaronson Oracle—so I will not bother summarizing it again here. I will focus on only the version of the problem where the predictor is omniscient unless otherwise noted. Newcomb's problem doesn't seem paradoxical, or even particularly difficult to interpret from my vantage. Of course, Nozick makes the point that everyone seems to feel this way, and that the interesting thing would be trying to figure out how to get the differing perspectives to collide. These remarks are an attempt to reconcile some of the differing intuitions about Newcomb-type problems, as well as the introduction of a new Newcomb-like problem.

Nozick suggests that you should take both boxes, but does not believe that he has answered the question conclusively in the article. He seems to have just found himself assuming that because it would be possible to defect against your past self who intended to not take the second box, you would take the second box at least some of the time. This conflates the possibility of defection with its actualization. From what little I know of Nozick, this seems to be his political philosophy at its core—an assumption of opportunistic defection and yet still trying to construct palatial systems of life. This position is entirely honest, but confused. From a cursory reading of some of his works, Nozick seems to assume correctly that intentions don't determine outcomes, but implicitly fails to notice that intentions prune the space of possible outcomes that a given intelligent agent would seek. I feel like there's probably some more explicit statements on this in the sections of Invariances and Anarchy, State, & Utopia that I didn't get to read while I was in Seattle in December, but I'll have to check later. I also feel like I do need to give credit to Nozick’s assumptions here, as he was living in a corner of the Twentieth Century Anglosphere where most people conflated defection and self-interest. Even in the vise grip of that cultural assumption he and many others were able to at least hold onto the will to reason if not always overcome immense odds and construct reasonable realities for themselves and others. To quote the poet Anderson, when love is gone, there’s always justice, and when justice is gone, there’s always force. Provided that force is at least informed by decent compassion and aesthetics, not all is lost. I have often been the sort of man who, like Nozick, believes I live in that most cynical reality. It is only by the loving care of my friends that I have been able to embrace the discipline required to transcend that assumption. 

The two examples that Nozick chooses in his article—the Vaccine choice and choice of the Brothers—are both cases of an agent's need to choose a correct strategy while knowing the range of possible realities, yet not which one they inhabit. Both are well satisfied by the dominance principle. Yet, in the case of the Newcomb Problem, the consequential reality is socially constructed by the individual who chooses or does not choose to take the second box. Thus, it seems that if one is able to interpret the principle of expected utility, one should be able to be the kind of agent that possesses the self-control to take only the million dollar box. The Predictor is of course able to predict a lack of faith or an impossible greed in the agent. The problem does not specify as to which, but such specification is unnecessary as the problem is agnostic as to the identities and relationships of the box-taker and the Predictor. Following its abstract formulation, the Newcomb Problem is framed not as a moral judgement, but a rational judgement. Such is the case of all problems concerning the acquisition of currency or other transactable types of utility. There is no reason to believe that such defects would be present in an agent who had adequately interpreted the problem. Only a fool would choose anything other than simply taking only box B. The agent's mind is transparent, and the only thing to do in that circumstance is to rise to it, becoming the kind of agent that the situation demands. All other options are inferior. If one can submit to the limits of control, one is able to earn the greatest reward available.

The narrative that somehow one should intend to take only the thousand dollar box at the moment of prediction and then, through force of free will, take both boxes is either incoherent, or simply demands further specification from the problem. One must assume that the predictor could detect the intent to defect in the chooser, even if it is latent. The predictor knows how the chooser will respond to the environment of the problem even if the chooser does not know their own response at the time of the prediction. Depending on our beliefs about the informational structure of the world, we could imagine that an agent innocent of the potential success of defection could be introduced to the idea of taking two boxes by an outside power after the moment of prediction and successfully defeat the predictor's abilities, but this relies on the predictor somehow not being able to notice that the chooser would choose to defect and take both boxes if the idea was introduced, or that the predictor would be unable to predict that the chooser would come into contact with such an outside power. Of course, if the chooser's mind is not transparent to the predictor, then one can imagine all sorts of Mamet-esque method acted cons, but while that genre of problem brings great personal joy to me, it is hardly as interesting as the philosophical implications of the omniscient variant. 

Newcomb’s problem role in scholarship is mostly a shibboleth to test decision theories and decision theorists, the former because of the limited computational blindnesses of models like Causal Decision Theory, and the latter largely because of bias or confusion. For instance, it seems like frequently the two-box solution appeals to materialist types who are extremely concerned that bringing discussions of how parts of reality might be socially constructed opens the floodgates of theoretically infinite woo. The justification for the one-box solution—namely that the reality is socially constructed by the chooser’s actions—feels insufficiently rigorous even to me as it cannot prove why the one-boxer chooses only one box, except that they are the type of person who can interpret the reality of the situation and choose the highest expected utility outcome. This is certainly not the same level of certainty that the two-boxer feels. If one attempts to evaluate the problem from the perspective of the chooser, rather than from some kind of simulated third-person perspective, one sits uneasily with individuality's inherent uncertainty. 

My attention strays easily from potential solutions to wider implication. Newcomb’s Problem is beloved by analytical philosophy for the same reasons that it is altogether unheard of and likely entirely uninterpretable by mainstream societies that coordinate either through technical or emotional protocols. The problem describes a kind of coordination that can only be accomplished if you accept that sense of self is accepted to be unstable, which is anathema to the kind of assured consistent perspective necessary for doing most technological development that doesn’t involve selection effects. Taking the broadest definition of engineering—perhaps most easily specified as bounded optimization—one assumes that one's sense of self is stable. For, if it were not stable, then one would not be able to work towards the hoped optimization criteria, and instead would spend all their resource fearful that their future self will undo their labors for arbitrary reasons. It is remarkably well specified, and thus those with a well-cultivated engineering mindset are often able to interpret and speculate on its content and implications, whereas if it was written in a less explicit manner it would likely go the way of most other attempts at non-dualistic psychology, so often invoking a holistic worldview as a justification for abandoning systemization and rigor. In studying the problem, I only became more convinced that the many insights it generates are anathema to the sorts of decision theories that actually dominate the public sphere. While I believe that the investigation of rational decision theories is of critical importance to both human psychology and artificial intelligence research—both pure and applied—I am confused by the general failure of both analytical philosophy and artificial intelligence to engage with the variance of decision theories that have evolved in history. Certainly, all presently specified decision theories are flawed or at least incomplete, but clearly so is modern decision theory. It has always seemed to me that the necessary strategy for the application of decision theory to the real world was incomplete if it was simply a priori analysis, frequently committed only by those who were able to engage with it as a recreational practice. The empirical comparison of existent decision-making behaviors has always felt like the missing piece of any of the gains from the purely theoretical domain were to have any practical use. Indeed, as we have seen with the evolution of almost every branch of cognitive science, the historical constraints of theorists often lead them with a deep myopia, perhaps best demonstrated by the rise of behaviorism at the same time as the rise of control theory. We are dominated by the metaphors we live by more than I would like to admit. Rationalism as a tradition is less dominated by metaphor than virtually any other, perhaps only because it has chosen the least corruptible and most generalizable metaphor: mathematics and computation by way of Descartes and Spinoza, which is so universally applicable that it is likely incorrect to even refer to it as a metaphor even though a potentially descriptive way of thinking of the corpus of mathematics is the total of meaningfully descriptive metaphors. However, this does not mean that rationalism is not without its limits. In order to relate two objects, one must be able to specify the process by which one relates those two objects, leading one to need to specify which objects one is relating before the process of relation can take place. In short, rationalism can look at anything, but it can't look at everything at once. It can know that holism is a true principle—a totality must be by definition total—but a totality cannot be analyzed without abstracting away some of its content. This, I think, provides a pretty good way to think about the epistemic basis for trying to implement something like Functional Decision Theory or extensions or modifications thereof, as FDT serves as a method of circumventing immanent reactivity. Of course, a central problem of implementing specific policies in an FDT strategy remains how one generates policies, which must still contend with the black swan risk inherent in attention prioritization.  


Rationalism as a demographic and tradition is largely in denial of the fact that the vast majority of the population considers it to be only a naive affectation. The common conception is that rationalism is fit only for those who have failed to find a place in more sponsored communication protocols, and instead eke out an uneasy existence at the margins, powered by autistic focus but somehow failing to truly understand the reindeer games of social life. At the same time, it is also the only tradition that is able to reliably describe the world, and thus some version of it must—even under ersatz attribution—be considered the source of all knowledge that is not accidental. If one were to notice a fire burning in the forest and know instinctively not to burn oneself, rational thought would be required to predict the spread of the flames, to say nothing of the type of rationality required to discover cooking, or the fact that the evolutionary process that generated those instincts was able to encode rational behavior, even only through blind selection or mimesis. It is rather pathetic that I have to write this, but knowing the reason for a phenomenon's behavior is the only method by which one could modify that phenomenon. Deal only with cause and effect. Fortune is blind to all influence: If luck is law, one could never become lucky intentionally. 

Yet, there is something of an uncomfortable class war that has never truly concluded in Western Civilization. Rational materialists have a tendency to be negged into submission by pseudorational idealists as a method of extracting their labor. This stance is taken by Chapman in Geeks, MOPs, and Sociopaths, serving as a good countermodel to Rao's Gervais Principlewhich fails to properly identify the Geek and the Clueless as the same type of worker. This leaves me with a responsibility to consider populist alternatives to reason even if, by negation, we have to understand that there is no logic more powerful than reason and thus supposedly "transrational" modes of thought are patently absurd and exist only to exploit the intellectual charity of rational intelligences. We must consider strategies that choose to take purposefully irrational action as a method to gain short term advantage. This can be explained as either simple ignorance, or a Hamiltonian Spite strategy where the instigator can more easily survive the chaos of confusion and benefit from a position of comparative advantage. I am of course asserting that all irrational action is costly, which might look like I'm ignoring situations such as the victory of King Carl at the Battle of Narva, but this is simply a case of accidental rationality through abject stupidity on the part of Carl, as conceivably with advanced enough meteorology he could have known he was making the correct choice, but with the sensors of 1700 there's no way in hell he did. Thus, one has to assume that Carl was simply ignorant, but there are doctrines—mostly theistic in nature—that might claim Carl possessed great wisdom. However, we have return to the proposition earlier in the paragraph, and note that those perspectives are either suicidal or only attempting at an instinctual standard of life in their willful inability to analyze the world, or are being exploited by cynical Hamiltonian Spite strategies that exploit their unscientific perspective. 

Unfortunately (and for obvious reasons) both pre-and-postmodernism tend to avoid systematic decision theory problems and models. Yet, recently in Rome, M. Vassar Arc introduced me to a song from the singer-songwriter Jewel Kircher’s 1995 album Pieces of You, which, with a bit of paranoid extrapolation, provides basically all the raw material necessary to formulate an alternative test to the Newcomb Problem that better depicts the supposed "transrational" reasoning popular in postmodern society. I will call this test the Sensitive Problem for reasons of clarity. For the moment, we will focus on a single clause of the song, but the rest of the lyrics simply reinforce this distillation. Let us read this according to Barthes’ principle of the death of the author and be agnostic as to whether it is Kircher speaking or an imagined character who I will call The Sensitive One, as I am going to read far more into these lyrics than was likely ever intended by their author. 

I was thinking, that it might do some good
If we robbed the cynics and took all their food
That way what they believe will have taken place
And we'd give it to everybody who'll have some faith
So please be careful with me, I'm sensitive
And I'd like to stay that way

Let's further specify this “Sensitive Problem" and make it as similar to the original Newcomb as possible. I know this is a case of somewhat manic apophenia, but bear with me.  

The Predictor analyzes an agent and tries to see if the agent would be willing to attempt to win a fight to the death tomorrow night, against a random opponent.  If the agent is willing to try to defend its own life, it is invariably killed by the Predictor. If it would go entirely limp and not fight for itself, it survives.

The Newcomb problem tests rational self-interest in a scenario where local rational self interest isn't enough, and one has to collaborate with one's past and future selves to gain an optimal outcome. The Sensitive Problem is the opposite. One must intentionally avoid collaborating with one's past and future selves to remain alive—note that The Sensitive Problem states that it might do some good to take all of their food, not some. One must assume an intense negative valuation on future coordination, negative to a degree that it is not worth preserving any agency at all. Specifically, The Sensitive Problem claims that one should not attempt to rationally appreciate the situation, as rationally appreciating risk produces a cynical loss of innocence, equating innocence with sensitivity. This is to say, a finite circumstance with at least local zero-sum characteristics—which is to say any circumstance with meaningful choice or consequence—is a possibility-limiting environment because it fundamentally demands a response. Finite circumstances respond to one's will and action. The only alternative possible environment is a hypothetical infinite space where, probabilistically, everything happens at least once and there is no way to pressure that environment into a limited set of behaviors. I'm Sensitive asserts that any will and action fundamentally limits the potential for one’s immanent awareness of life to make the correct choice without considering the possibility of failure.

The Sensitive One asserts, in another part of the song, that she has this theory that if we’re told we’re bad it’s the only idea we’d ever have. It’s a far more extreme version of Nozick’s position, a concept called alternately Theucides’ Trap, the Hobbesian Trap, Schelling’s Dilemma, or Liu’s Dark Forrest where the recognition of the potential of defection by one party leads to the assumption of its necessity by the other. The Sensitive One implicitly asserts that the recognition of the possibility of defection is the source of defection (or abstract evil) itself, which makes the problem a test of morality, rather than a test of rationality. Intriguingly, by being a test of morality, it implicitly takes a specific perspective, with specific values, and tests whether or not the test-taker fits in with those values. Opposed to Nozick, The Sensitive One implicitly takes the stance that its not worth grappling with the problem of coordination with past and future selves, and indeed suggests that the entire problem comes from the sort of thinking that invariably arises when one attempts to act strategically across time. Quoting further from I'm Sensitive: Anyone can start a conflict, its harder yet to disregard it. In reality, there is of course room for the strategy of at least temporarily circumventing conflicts, but this is not synonymous with resolving them. If one’s will is in conflict with another’s, the only ways to resolve this are either to disregard one of the two wills by prosecuting the conflict, merging the two wills in compromise, or by capitulating and retreating out of the bounds of the conflict. The Sensitive One's theory is that somehow by retreating from the bounds of that conflict, a benevolent outcome will happen somehow by default. In practice, this translates to a moral obligation to eat the seed corn by conflating environmental constraint and social constraint, as well as entirely ignoring the possibility of low-communication environments demanding strong border defenses. There are all sorts of environments where correct action can only be informed by a clear theory of tradeoffs. Sometimes those tradeoffs effect agents other than oneself, though any sensible utilitarian would recognize the validity of other persons as moral patients and attempt to avoid externalizing harm.  

The perspective of the Sensitive Problem is the sort of thinking that I see in the type of liberal or leftist who somehow wants to infantilize men like King and Gandhi as unable or unwilling to sympathize or empathize with the logic of their adversaries. Amakusa Shirō, the leader of the Shimabara Rebellion, seems to me a much better example of the misinterpretation of King and Gandhi, for they—and especially King—were dispassionate strategists, possessed by indomitable wills that demanded the analysis of their opposition. There is certainly much to be said about their careers, but one cannot count for their ability to respond to threat an opportunity by good intentions alone. It is equivalent to assuming that the whole Christ as a strategist is included in the notion that one should turn the other cheek, ignoring all of his less passive sayings and deeds and assuming that such an aphorism held eternally outside of context. So, what does it mean to see the world from another angle and be an everyday angel, if not to embrace a sense of hope at the expense of rigorous tactics? Amacusa certainly seemed to be possessed by this hope, leading to a needless civil war committed by faithful men and women who must have been genuinely confused about the suicidal nature of their cause.  

Even as I condemn The Sensitive One for doubting the promise of rationality, I must remind myself to sympathize with its fear. Reason implies that one could isolate clear cause and effect. One promises to one’s self or others that action may follow observation, either by the senses or the intellect, and that one may observe one’s own actions to confront and perfect them. The trouble is that this covenant is so often broken when individuals fail to summon the courage to confront the ever-multiplying province of implication. Convenient myths often justify action far more interpretably than causes that are either obscure or incommunicable. Perhaps if one was alone and engaged in an abstract activity, composing music say, and keeping it secret or releasing it with the cold comfort of total anonymity, one could justify every deed. Yet, in the social context, gaslighting sets in. The reconciliation of multiple perspectives is imperfect at best, and it is far easier to abandon the often disappointing sanity of probabilistic knowledge in favor of the mutability of definite mysticism. One must grapple with one’s uncertainty in order to know anything at all, and seldom is anyone up to the task every time it is demanded. I see no other alternative to this simple humility in light of the fundamentally finite character of our understanding. Yet, while I find it absurd and frankly perverse, I can understand the desire for a logic more powerful than reason. Philosophy is indeed incoherent when it fails to confront the fact that it is always limited by its own perspective, something that everyone from Kant, to al-Ghazali and Chomsky reliably remind us of. 

The Sensitive Problem focuses on the political, so we will remain focused on that scale of relationship for the moment. Even when a society is meaningfully divided, the divisions are rarely appreciated as constraints and are instead assumed to be immutable realities, demanding factional war. Such factions are rarely so mutually incompatible as to demand a violent response, and yet as history tells us such violence has arisen time and again. Though somewhat incomplete with a number of geopolitical considerations, The Nazis’ manufacture of both internal and external threats is the canonical example of pseudorationalist crimes in the modern consciousness, but there are countless other examples that need not be listed again here. The fear of such pointless brutality that animates blind hope in the everyday angels is also the emotional drive that forces me to try and confront the reasoning of the brutalizers. The trouble is that the everyday angel perspective assumes that distinctions between persons itself animates the will to violence, rather than asserting that the will to violence is independent of differences between persons.

Yet, from history to date, it is rather unclear if a state of war is the rule or the exception in human society at large, though one could of course make far better claims regarding individual regions. However, in the case of the Sensitive Problem, a historical analysis is hardly persuasive to the perspectives that themselves find the Sensitive Problem persuasive. The sensitive problem asserts that it would do some good to eliminate the entire discipline of precedential analysis, as the cynics have to have made a judgement that it is correct to be cynical, and precedential analysis would be entirely meaningless if only positive judgements were considered admissible. We are left with an ahistorical mode of analysis. Whether out of weak thought or potent thoughtlessness, humanity often does decide that cruelty is a solution to conflict. Such depravity is not eliminated by ignoring it, but only by correcting the errors in reasoning that justified it. Such cruelty only emerges when we lack the imagination or bravery to introspect and develop better plans. In the case of the Nazis or any other criminals who were able to organize mob violence, a justification that is good enough to produce a sense of group-unity against a scapegoating target is enough to mobilize coordinated aggressive action simply by making it difficult to consider another option. Visibly questioning the party line simply makes you easy prey. It doesn’t matter if the justification makes sense, it matters only if it makes enough sense to make it difficult to question yourself.

Troublingly, this type of offensive violent action is powered far more often by moral judgements similar to the Sensitive Problem than the Cynics judged by that problem. The Sensitive Problem’s Predictor creates an in-group by testing for a similar violent intent while pretending its intent is pacifistic. While the pretense of enforcing a prohibition on cynical accumulation of resources makes the lyrics a modicum more tolerable, the violence is still there. Again, note that it says all not a surplus of the cynics' food. This is not to say that the paranoid stockpiling of resources at the expense of collective economic or ecological utility is always justified, but the position of the Sensitive Problem is unjustifiably extreme. The Sensitive One asserts that somehow lacking faith that one’s needs would simply be provided for without intentional preparation is defection against the human spirit, and that concern for one’s future autonomy is the origin of conflict rather than simply an attempt to endure it. The mind, in the account of the song, is not the sort of instrument that is supposed to be used to make tradeoffs. Indeed, the capacity to do evil is confused with the capacity to accomplish anything at all besides the construction of a unifying state of hope. There is much to be said for unifying states of hope, but the murder of all populations that harshed the vibe by tracking the potential for disaster is irrefutably insane. Passing the sensitive problem is equivalent to culling the entire demographic that keeps records, knows history, and is willing to act with strategic independence.  

In short, I have been analyzing the lyrics of a pop song that demands a pogrom. What is a pogrom if not a scapegoating raid on an outgroup that has kept records of the world when the dominant culture has not? In famine, a hungry crowd invariably emerges, and the potential solutions are either charity, a jubilee, a pogrom, or a bacchanal that takes the whole of the society back to a state of nature. It matters not what causes the famine—it could just as easily be a famine of validation as a famine of calories—it matters only that the crowd has failed to care for itself, and looks towards easy prey. Often, the easiest prey is those persons that spent their time tracking the behavior of world instead of aspiring to high rank in the ugly meritocracy of violence. It is far easier for a ruling class to direct the rage of the hungry crowd at a scapegoat than to attempt to remedy the situation. The ruling class blames the hunger of the crowd on the act of keeping account of the process that led to the hunger in the first place. This act of bad faith ignores the possibility of learning from the past and avoiding further devastation in the future. Instead, it attempts to obliterate history, and see the world from another angle: that of spite and of hope, of good and evil, but never the inviolate knowledge of cause and effect. Those who have focused on the object-level mechanisms that determine the behavior of the world are so often blind to the metagame of threat and opportunity that distributes power and leverage.

It seems like the central question for political philosophy in the twenty-first century is simply how to make the conflict between game and metagame, between text and subtext, visible to those nerds and materialists who have thus far successfully avoided being scapegoated through strategies of either trade or invisibility. I'm not sure how to accomplish that, but it seems highly unlikely that it involves amputating the ability to successfully complete the million dollar solution to Newcomb's Problem in order to avoid death in the Sensitive Problem. It strikes me that the attachment to try and look for a logic more powerful than reason comes from a misinterpretation of the structure of risk and reward in the world. As we near the close of the second decade of the twenty first century, we exist in a period of normalized Lovecraftianism, with various specters of doom available for any given political persuasion. Many of those who have seen the promise of rationality broken see present progress as debt financed, with repossession just around the corner, or as accidental where no individual has anything approximating better than random agency over the physical world. The potential for total extinction leads the mind into a confusion that all progress might be inherently risky unless, somehow, it could make disaster entirely impossible. One undervalues the future, assuming that the potential of black swan events implies that we live in a world of finite reward and infinite risk, and that in that environment the correct thing to do is to stop playing.

The question is, why? This is madness, certainly, but it must come out of something. I believe that it comes out of invalidating one's own perspective and assuming that another perspective is somehow able to validate behavior by its fiat, rather than one's own experience. The anxiety of individuals who interpret the world through a social lens of praise and blame rather than cause and effect is understandable, if not itself worth experiencing. If words crush things that are unseen, this implies that the Sensitive One and others like it are affected by other individuals perceptions far more than would be adaptive as an individual. If one does not identify with one's own perspective, and instead with private or public opinion of another individual or collective, then indeed the correct thing to do is to avoid all potential blame and ignore the promise of rational action. It is always in the interests of the validator to praise and blame according to their own interests if the individual who they affect, for that individual is no longer an individual and is instead an extension of their will—a Pavlovian thrall.

I will terminate this essay at the moment, but will leave off with one final question that I do not currently have an answer to: What is the legal status of Pavlovian thralls? At what place does agency start and end? When one is animated by the will of another, who is responsible for the action? I am inclined to think that the question is incoherent. Agents, as individual processes, are almost as absurd to think about as inviolate taxonomies of the world as fully discrete species as described often by pop ecologists. Yet, if one is to attempt to think of correct action in the world, isolating the local cause of incorrect action and shifting it seems the only potential method for restorative justice. All justice systems are limited by their ontology, and it seems highly unlikely that the West will be able to reform its laws in the coming centuries if it still takes as immutable a concept of individuality derived not from the ability to reason, but from Roman property rights. 

Tear Down This (Money)Wall? by Bryce Hidysmith

( Soundtrack: Samy Deluxe - Weck Micht Auf, which I discovered by googling graffiti from a third story wall in Kreuzberg. ) 

In Berlin tonight, Z. A, a neurologist and great kubernetes of community housing, mentioned that she once made large pinboards of money—a few hundred dollars on each—and hung them from a wall in one of the community houses that she worked on back when I knew her in California. I think this might be a kind of excellent design for a rather specific piece of sensory infrastructure. It seems as though any given cohabitant community could use this kind of a structure for the distribution of some amount of petty cash if people are in need of expedient monetary resources. Whatever the amount that would be irrelevant to be consumed by the community could be put out in this fashion, used to pay the parking meters, tip the deliverypersons, purchase additional coffee or better quality spices, or—much more importantly—to buy necessities for those that need them instead of the irrelevant sundries that the more moneyed members would dispose their income on.  

At smaller scales of behavior, this quantity of resources is referred to "spare change," but when one lives not as an individual but in a conurbation, such as a monastery, art collective, or community house, this quantity of resources is likely an order of magnitude or two larger—a hundred dollars instead of ten, enough to potentially make a great deal of difference in an individual's daily life if substantial fractions of it could be taken freely. This serves the initial purpose of simply making the residents of the community's life easier, but also serves a couple of sousveilant purposes as well. The rate that it is consumed can be interpreted, with fast types showing a general case of financial insecurity or greed. Perhaps one could mitigate it by simply asking individuals to write their usage of the currency and sign their name beside, to be judged by the jury of their cohabitants. 

Yet, this increase in dimensionality of data would decrease the fact that the main use of the currency would be monitoring the way that individuals behave when there is free currency that can be taken from a commons under without anyone knowing, insofar as such a thing *can* be documented at all.  Thus, the main purpose that a Moneywall would in fact serve is to see if the whole of it ends up being stolen in a short timespan—likely a single day but one could envision arrangements where there is a different unit of time would be used. One might create a general punishment to the community if this happens, perhaps by the decimation of the community by eviction. This might also be done by percentage. One could specify that, if more than a certain percentage is taken within a day, then that percentage of the population is randomly evicted. I would suggest perhaps 40% for maximum effectiveness, but this is conjecture without a clear analysis as to why. To take the entire Moneywall (or the specified percentage of that model is used) would signify a will to directly defect on the commons, and if indeed the strength of the monastery is the monk and the strength of the monk is the monastery, such an action even by a single individual would cast doubt on the entire community. If one is to fight in phalanxes to regularly defeat barbarism, then one must remember that the phalanx is only as strong as its weakest point, and that every man must shield his neighbor and forgo individualistic defense to build a proper shield wall. If I am to totally belabor the metaphor, then the free flow of capital must have no discontinuous obstructions to gain maximum benefit. 

Etiquette in Battle Royale Scenarios by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Tommy Genesis - Execute > 

Recently, battle royale gametypes have become significantly more common in video games. Frequently, there is an etiquette assumption that forming teams is inappropriate. Teams currently unbalance the battle royale mode, but likely would not unbalance them if players were more strategically rational than they currently are in any of these games. This limited strategic rationality has introduced a semi-functional equilibrium state. 

If there are no teams, then there is no strategy better than playing Fabian. (Note: it might not quite technically be pure Fabian as they do not take costs from simply moving. However, rather obviously, avoiding conflicts means that other, more aggressive players take out more of each other before you are ever put into battle, and unless there is some benefit to battle, it makes a great deal more sense to just stay avoidant and peripheral.) However, if there are teams, then Fabian is no longer the dominant strategy as playing aggressively is incentivized to disrupt premeditated alliances. In such a scenario, the objective becomes attempting to link to a benevolent alliance as fast as possible, avoiding being taken out by the random placements on the map. It seems as though the normalized equilibrium assumes that the majority of players will be emotionally volatile enough to not actually have the will to play Fabian and gain enjoyment from avoidance, letting the few Fabian-enjoying players gain an advantage in thoughtfulness, whereas the more volatile players are likely more addicted and have a comparable advantage from built-up reflex. The fact that these games are simple entertainment means that there is no reason for them to gain the "escape velocity" to start producing metagame strategies from their reasonably strategically symmetrical equilibrium state. 

This seems to have a direct extension into other fields that might be viscerally enjoyable, but the visceral enjoyment might remove the possibility for second to nth order strategies being built in the metagame on the primary gameplay. This also probably explains most of the reason why it seems that only simulations that do not provide much visceral experience (MMOs, Minecraft) ever produce the kind of discipline one would actually need to produce strategic—rather than simply tactical—behavior in a virtual environment. There is something a bit disconcerting to the fact that the dominance of video games has not actually trained strategic foresight into the majority of its participants. Instead, it seems to have produced purely tactical reaction, contributing to the atomization of individuals and producing coordination models similar to the swarm-behavior found in the current Tumblr/4Chan design consensus when similar designs have been applied to other UX problems. This seems to be the entrainment of the (post-)millennial generation, and I am sorry for our lots. 

Codes of Silence & Codes of Law by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Bauhaus -  The Man With The X-Ray Eyes

There are two standard narratives as to the nature of the police in society. One of them is that police are by their nature men of honor, men straight out of the silver nitrate-tinged frontier, attempting to exert order on a chaotic world. This is true in the ideal, and perhaps sometimes we live up to our ideals, but in practice the enforcers of the law are as susceptible to corruption as anyone else—even more so due to their privileged position. The other theory, then, is that such corruption is unavoidable, and that the role of the police is to simplify the strategic environment by becoming a singleton. This is this model where the feudalists and the gangsters provide similar services. One may live an entire generation at least in the same protection racket, and so the logic goes that living within the same protection racket makes the rules more explicit and thus more livable, even if those rules are simply the necessity of appeasing a capricious lord.

Both of these narratives seem to be incomplete to me, as they avoid the possibility that the existence of professional law enforcement groups is potentially just a way of providing cover for law-breakers by scapegoating less advantaged law-breakers. If one is able to provide the appearance of common knowledge that all crimes are prosecuted with remarkable effectiveness to enough of the population, then it is possible for a class to arbitrage the knowledge of holes in said enforcement. It is possible, likely even, that entire classes of lawbreakers could coordinate in such a way if their desires for how to break the law were normalized enough that they could predict one another's objectives reasonably effortlessly. Provided that the desires are sufficiently similar, one needs only install a code of omertà. It seems likely that an entirely class might be able to coordinate in an entirely decentralized fashion, potentially developing a clear symbiosis with the law enforcement bodies of its localities. It is also probably worth noting that such codes of silence have a tendency to naturally emerge when one is dealing with individuals of sufficient similarity to oneself, as one would be a fool to provide information that could just as easily apply to oneself. It would need no central coordination, only a sense of identity. 

Where The Echo Is Louder Than The Sound Itself by Bryce Hidysmith

 Photo by A. Gourley, Feb. 2018&nbsp;

Photo by A. Gourley, Feb. 2018 

< Soundtrack: Sun City Girls - The Shining Path, Kim Jung Mi - 햇님/The Sun  >

On Halloween of 2017, a friend and I posted thirty-nine theses on a message board in Sproul Plaza on the grounds of UC Berkeley. We would have aimed for ninety-five, but we got close to done in thirty-nine. We left an email to contact us if anyone were so inclined, and we figured that maybe we would find someone interesting who we could communicate with. Amusingly, it turned out that all of the theses were taken down the next day with the routine cleaning that happens at the end of every month. Nobody emailed us. We rationalized the frustration of leaving a clue and not having anyone follow it by assuming that the primary value of the deed was being able to say that we posted the theses in the first place. It was the right sort of thing to do to commemorate the five-hundredth Anniversary. There is much to be said for costly signals directed to oneself. Sometimes you have to remind yourself who you are, in the likely case that you forget. 

Rome is a city of costly signals. Very few (perhaps none) that remain are signals directed at individuals for themselves, and instead the vast majority of them are telling you to know your place. There stand monuments. There's the Alter of the Fatherland, which is basically a meta-monument made out of smaller monuments. There stand basilicas. There are partially reconstructed pieces of civic infrastructure that have taken on a divine quality simply by being dug up out of the ground. All of them are ways of asserting an order on the world by forcing an individual to aspire to an ideal that is claimed to have existed, but is now unattainable. The divine is painted on the ceilings of the chapels and basilicas to humble us, to make us crane our necks so that as we study the content of the murals we also must remember that the content lords over us, surrounded by overwhelming and frankly psychedelic adornment. I can't spend more than a few minutes among the baroque without feeling a bit seasick. I didn't go inside of St. Peter's, as I was feeling more than a bit exhausted just from touring the Vatican Museums. I feel like if one had been raised within this system either at mater or magister, then one might have a different experience, but the refinement of the confusing capacity of art was so adept that I must admit that I felt comfortable only in the Sistine Chapel and the room of Raphael's School of Athens. Both of those rooms were cases where the structure of the artwork was so impeccable that it demanded attention and understanding. All symbols are related so impeccably that the will of the artists were not obfuscated, and the messages were clear as day, with further levels of interpretation available with conceivably infinite pattern recognition. I didn't go inside St. Peter's for the same reasons I was happy I'd entered the Sistine. There is something oddly telling about the fact that Molgbug and the Neoreactionaries often use "the Cathedral" as a metaphor for those that install Maya, while also being pro-Catholic, but at the same time it's probably worth noting that the Old Masters who helped manufacture the informational content of cathedrals are perhaps the greatest example of individuals using the Kolmagorov Option in the history of the West. On that note, its probably worth noting Raphael's prominent placement of Sappho on The Parnassus. 

There is a sense in so many parts of Rome that interpretation is against the will of the territory. The city demands that I know my place before I know myself. I cannot attempt learn the character of the city and remember the character of myself independently. I am a foreigner. I have a history of my own. And while my history is haunted by the ghosts of Rome even on the other side of the world, it is not Roman history.  Yet, Rome speaks a command language. It has a place for you, but you have no choice in the matter. I can't help but think of the gang of minor scam artists that congregate around Trajan's Column, trying to flag down tourists to talk to them, giving them identical cheap bracelets and claiming that those bracelets are gifts from Africa before asking for money. They're clearly indentured, caught up in a debt scheme where they can't ever make their quota of sales for the day. They operate in small packs, and have developed a strategy of preying on the hope of Americans who don't want to seem racist by ignoring a migrant in the ruins of the imperial city. Probably the only places that I've found in this city that are actually comfortable are the Nuovo Mercato Esquilino, which might be my favorite proper market that I've been to outside of Bangkok, and an extremely friendly goth club in San Lorenzo where some of our crew played chess one night. Neither of those places are haunted by obfuscated preferences. The play of haggling or dark-path aesthetics is interpretable by all, and there isn't a need to attempt to join any theatrics that wouldn't happen by default.  

There are older, more comfortable versions of the city beneath the earth, back at the levels of topology from before the seven hills were de facto flattened as debris piled up. There's the old villa stories underground of San Clemente, where I drank from a spring of water flows that quenched the thirst of the citizens of the city during the days of the war. I was comfortable there, and then a tour group of French teenagers came in sulking, and I overheard a British woman gasp with horror that there were coins offered to the heathen Mithraeum. I stumbled back above ground, and into a cafe, the Colosseum looming outside. I couldn't help but wonder if I was just filling in detail with ample apophenia. Maybe it's the white of the marble that throws me off, and if the whole system was rendered in polychrome I would be much less pleased. Color would distract from structure, and without its distraction one can almost believe in a rational world. My mind does not attempt to fill them with ornament, rather it hopes that the symbols may have meaning, or that things that are pure aesthetic pleasure may be symbols. The mosaic floors rarely have data beyond decoration. The symbol—the cross, the fasces, the keys, the SPQR, the wolf and her children—even in the days of Trajan it is almost secondary to the wonder of sheer adornment. This is a country where the echo is louder than the sound itself. 

One gets a sense that the overall aesthetic that the Romans had when designing buildings and art was derived from a sense of strategic insecurity. They must build an obelisk or an arch because they must demonstrate that they could build such a thing. This is the fundamental nature of monuments that are not optimized for durability or the inclusion of great quantities of information. The overall order of their state depended largely on the ability of the highly-ranked to demonstrate imperium without fail, leading to an increasingly performative society as Julius and Augustus faded into memory. Both Julius and Augustus knew about the performative nature of power, as of course did Cato, and were both able to harness it without losing control of the show. This is, perhaps, one of the best explanations for what could be meant by finding Rome a city of brick, and leaving it a city of marble. One must remember that the marble was typically only a facade. One of the most central moral questions that one has to contend with is whether or not one sides with Cato or Caesar—must you use a strategic advantage simply because you can, even if that strategic advantage is built on the normalization of a level of corruption? 2016 to the present seems to have begun a dialectic on this subject in earnest, with almost everyone taking mixed and largely situational positions driven by fear or opportunism, but I will have to let my own opinions solidify more fully before I address these questions.

I read through Graeber's Debt on the train back from Florence yesterday, and the Roman conception of property and its free-use is so alien to the way that I think, which is deeply influenced by the Christian (and especially Protestant) tendency to need to give everything a justification outside of itself. It seems almost as though the Christian revolution in Rome was an attempt to check the ego of the pater familias, especially when one notes that a major reason for the rise of Christ and not of Mithra was that Mithraeums did not accept female members, whereas property owning widows were a major factor in funding the initial church. Christ is a far superior figure than Zeus or bastard fanfics like composite Osirapis. Such gods only served to create a fractal patriarchy that is able to incorporate and slowly process foreign bodies, either by way of vassalization or slavery. Graeber's comments on the Axial age strategy of military-currency-slavery are highly enlightening on this matter, and should not be underestimated. To briefly summarize, a conquering army melts the metal accoutrements of a conquered people into bullion, stamps it in coinage, distributes the coinage to the military, and demands that the official coinage is used to pay taxes. As slavery is normalized in this time period, a large slave economy of former captives emerges, mining further metals from conquered mines or working in agriculture. Chartalism, with an expansionist element. An element of this that Graeber does not necessarily overlook, but rather does not directly comment on, is the fact that to launch this system its necessary to have clear common knowledge about who the primary authority is, something that a fractal patriarchy religious system would be remarkably effective at producing. Though the circumstantial details of exactly how the Roman church began to require celibacy of its priests are a bit fuzzy—there is not a clear justification as to why the decisions of the Council of Elvira were made that I could find—I might imagine that it is an attempt to produce both a precedent of divinely ordained power over the body and its functions, as well as an attempt to avoid the clerical hierarchy being used to amass dynastic continuities of power and wealth. Both of those would be highly advantageous, but there are of course a great number of practical problems with this specific implementation that need no further discussion here. Centrally, a thing to remember is that design was a rarity in Rome. Reaction to circumstance was the order of the day. Locations imbued with such power as this rarely have space for non-reactive mental processes. As reactive processes are faster, frequently the contemplative processes of design are simply selected against strongly enough by the stressful pace of the environment that they no longer take place at all. One must assume that Rome, after the fall of the Republic, was a place where Marcus Aurelius was entirely remarkable for writing his Meditations, themselves representative of a stoic tendency to attempt to interface with and profit from the world without attempting to produce anything like justice within it—a tendency matched by the political wings of Taoism on the other side of Eurasia. There is more to be said. While this city is not infinite, it seems as though it might be eternal, and as such I would find myself dwelling on intractabilities for far longer than I might otherwise like. It is far easier to simply take one of the ample roads that leave this place and find somewhere easier to think. 

As far as I'm concerned, I think that to try and understand the writings of Acquinas as well as Chesteron's Orthodoxy before I solidify much more belief on any matters of spirit. I have an exceptional curiosity regarding the ways in which the Scholastics were able to preserve a wide range of thought in an environment that is at least stereotyped as massively dogmatic, and I have been keeping a copy of Augustine in my bag that I am sure I will get to shortly. Yet, my prejudices when it comes to religion are for a kind of self-sacrificial protestantism that is not taken very seriously by a pluralist and largely atheistic and esoteric ex-frontier city like the one of my birth. My familial traditions tell me that religion should an understated thing, an attempt to interpret the world knowing that you cannot be the one who is able to understand the whole of it, but nonetheless it is your responsibility to try like any good Christian to interpret the signs given, and make a rightly justified decision. If a hierarchy of divine authority demonstrated its ability to interpret signs better than myself, I would certainly follow its lead. Yet, such authority must come from the clear demonstration of the ability to interpret symbols and signs. The authority of a given perspective must be equal to its ability to transmit useful information to other perspectives, for if it holds secrets it must be assumed to be paid in the profit it gains from such asymmetric information. I cannot see any other arrangement that would permit me to see what was right by my own eyes. 

Regarding A System of Strategic Standards by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Ленингра́д - ВОЯЖ , Fever Ray - To The Moon & Back >

The following is move towards a formalization of a system of strategic standards, as discussed on top of a small mountain in Big Sur, California, in mid November and over email with one M. Vassar Arc. This is my assessment and extension of his model, which he notes was inspired partially by remarks made by Ayn Rand in various of her writings, and Machiavelli in Discourses on Livy. Additionally, if I was not in Rome with C. McKenzie and A. Gourley, I don't think I'd be able to think clearly on this subject at all. 

A strategic standard is a requirement for the "success" of a given evolutionary strategy. This is measured in the level of intergenerational stability that the strategy is able to couple to the type of agency that the strategy is able to reap from the practice of the strategy. To build on the ideas I noticed in Butler's Parable of the Sower and combining them with a rather heterodox interpretation of Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages, it is necessary to understand that the practice of a long-term evolutionary strategy requires that one integrates the means and ends of a given strategy, so that the achievable of a desired end bolsters the means for achieving that end again. Further remarks on the way that strategic standards must be integrated are here

Substandard: Firstly, we must understand that there is a failure to meet any of the standards at all. There are many behaviors that cease the life of the individual who undertake them, leaving them infertile in one way or another. While there are of course many reasons to remove the fertile capacities of individual organisms for the sake of a collective whole, it is also clear that the capacities of the collective must be enhanced in such a way as to pay for the sacrifice of those individuals fertility, otherwise the collective will run an overall population deficit and decline unto extinction. 

Standard of Life: Secondly, we have the Standard of Life, wherein the organism is able to reproduce but not dictate and of the circumstances of life of itself or its descendants. It is adaptable enough to be brought into the world without fear for its safety. It may live a debased existence. It may move entirely through the immanence of reflex, and thus be easily conditioned to serve. Yet, if the organism comes from a line that has met the standard of life it does not need to be afraid that it, itself, will fail to adapt to circumstance. Life finds a way, after all. The transformation may be the most brutish trial and error, but it will be accomplished in sufficient time to reproduce and allow their young to try their hand at meeting the standard of life as well. 

Standard of History: Building on the Standard of Life, we have the Standard of History, where the organism in question is able to dictate some of the circumstances of life by being able to control its environment, rather than simply react to its environment in an effective fashion. This is to say, meeting the standard of history is the capacity of making precedent with one's life. One is not able to necessarily define what precedent is made, but individuals who investigated the life of the person that met the standard of history could direct their life according to the precedent set. The Standard of Mythology seems to be a hazy and poorly remembered version of the Standard of History, where no convenient Herodotus is available to begin the process of interpretation, contextualization, and argument derived from biography. By meeting the Standard of History, by doing it their way and saying the things they truly feel, and not the words of one who kneelsthey become a life in the record of lives, such that other lives can define themselves in rebellion or immitation. 

(As an aside, it seems as though there's a general level of confusion regarding the nature of the Standard of History in the post-Napoleonic period, as Napoleon was only shooting for the Standard of History, and individuals shooting for higher standards are compared as though inferior to Napoleon, when in fact very many of them have done better. The Emperor knew that the only reason to have an emperor was to serve as a vanishing point, something that his few betters knew well. Napoleon was an expression of the fashions of the age, rather than attempting to exceed or direct them. His great genius was to know that the best he himself could do was to live within his means, something that, for instance, Meiji decided to disregard to glorious effect.)

Standard of If: Taken from the Rudyard Kipling poem cited in the title-link. The Standard of History constitutes participation, but not production, of a Hegelian Dialectic. The form of the dialectic itself seems to have to be produced by something other than this standard, something greater than and external to history. The will to name is distinct from the will to embody, for the will to name can name a great many identities that it might be sensible to play, given the circumstance. The Standard of If, then, is the ability to rise to meet circumstance, and to choose which circumstances one might choose to meet, as similar to the wisdom of Cyrus cited at the end of this post. The Standard of If is a sort of extensible, unbounded adaptive capacity. Wheres meeting the Standard of History requires one to fit into circumstance, the Standard of If requires one to shift circumstance by what is demanded by universals. 

Standards of Only Asymptotically Limited Agency: This is the realm of science fiction, including periods of fairly recent history in which humanity has indeed lived up to its potential by being able to execute on the Standard of If in collectives, rather than simply as individuals. The Manhattan Project, the Moonshot, and the Internet all effectively are remnant artifacts of methods of social organization stronger than If. The keen utopianism of any idealist kid trends towards this, as when one is a child one presumes that one's level of good faith collaboration and labor is likely normative for the whole of an individual's life, rather than normative only for the mind before it is broken by violations of trust. A positive singularity driven by friendly artificial intelligence are the limit as the standard approaches infinity. 

Notes From the Shelley-Keats House by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: The Mountain Goats - Harlem Roulette >

I went to the former home of the poet Keats yesterday. At the base of the Spanish Steps, it remains a small outpost of a dreaming spirit of Anglophone and Protestant character. It is the spirit of a wandering mind in territories of bad weather, of being captive physically but not mentally. Perhaps it is only in this state that man begins to attempt to divorce himself from nature, and accepts a quest towards discontinuous acts of change where one has framed the world in a low-fidelity abstraction so one can run computation on it. Of course, Borges' manuscript of a commentary "Keats' Nightengale" is there, for Borges was also always possessed by that same spirit, which he perhaps most obviously vocalizes in the lecture notes from his course on English Literature, to my knowledge the only example of his work as a professor that survives. A larger discussion of the exact nature of that enframing is for another time, but it is of remarkable interest that the Romantics clearly attempted to practice it, and the relationship of the enframing tendency and the Catholic world is of significant interest to me at this moment in time. 

In testament, Keats' old house is quiet. There are no photo ops, and so it is not terribly popular with the crowd captivated by the Spanish steps outside. But, it is the sort of place that offers copies of the poets' books in the reading room. Their library was buffeted by the Baroque and by the increasing relevance of the East. The Romantics were seduced by both, but still oddly provincial in tastes, utilitarian in behavior. If one is to think of the necessary conditions for thought in a world where splendor is used to dazzle the mind, then the mind must have a refuge where it is not fully dazzled to refine the little effects of language in the smallest turns of phrase. The artistic impulse can be characterized as both a metis and a techne, but it matters little which one contextualizes it as, for in the modern context they are used usually to denote a false political disagreement echoing the false political disagreements of the Romantics themselves. Both require concentration, dissociation, and sense of simultaneous safety and necessity. The refinement of language into sequences built for inspiration is just one example of this craft. The Romantics knew what they were doing in a political context, for while the modern assumptions of men like Shelley are that they were doomed soothsayers, attempting to conjure an alternative world in their scripts, they themselves knew that the invocations of such alternate worlds held real currency—he was married to Wollstonecraft after all, the implications of such a fact being looked over by perhaps all of those same people who would dismiss Shelley the Elder's strategies as flights of fantasy, following his death, and Shelley the Younger's writings as idle speculation rather than attempts at depicting the not only possible, but actual. Those same fools would likely assume that Gerome was to triumph, inevitably, over the Impressionists, while at the same time failing to notice that Gerome was, indeed, outputting work with much larger quantities of bits than the Impressionists ever would. While Keats wounds from printed verbiage are another story, one must remember that it was conjectured for some time that Byron might have become King of Greece, though this is of course cast in a most debatable light by modern scholars.

Their engagement with the world was uncompromising. The role of the poet has changed over the years. The post-Beat poets in the 1970s on were as far from engaged with the world as possible, unless they were rappers or other musicians—perhaps the first person I think of here is Leonard Cohen—and those were rising in an era of mass media that Byron and the like had begun creating back in the 19th century with industrially produced portraits and books, but certainly not the moving image on a telescreen half-way around the world. The question, I think, is what they were running away from, and what they were running towards. Industrialism was on the rise in England, and maybe the right thing to do was to follow the lead of Morris, but there seemed to be another distinct potential at hand: that of going back and trying to contend with the past and regain whatever noble spirit was at least hallucinated by men like Plutarch. Remember, Mary marks the humanity of the monster with Goethe's Sorrows of Young Werther, Milton's Paradise Lost, and Plutarch's Parallel Lives. Given that Goethe was himself a stop on the Grand Tour for quite some time, and Rome was the clear epicenter of the emergent Western project, it made sense that they were here. Keats himself noted that beauty was truthand truth beauty, but it is unclear if that sentiment was known to the other members of their set.

The Romantic rebellion was canonized in the heart of Rousseau, rather than the hand of Morris. Hope was valued over productive skill and enjoyable experience. The world was cultivated in the image of the ineffable fairy-tale of the intention of the mob. Insofar it was valued for its hope, it was valued for the addictive potential that hope produces. One might aspire to be Cato against Ceasar, but deny the trials of circumstance that limited both the Republican and Imperial strategies, and in that confusion built monuments like Wedding Cakes and simply hope that the general will of the people to maintain and survive would simply prevail. Perhaps this past is only valuable as a counterfactual, only usable as something to be rejected, kept in line of sight while one sails as far away from it as you can with a spyglass trained both at the fore and aft, until eventually that foreign country disappears under the curvature of the earth and it's possible to do something differently, somewhere and when else. Perhaps the best you can do is find a past that isn't yours, and repossess a bit of its marble to build a better foundation. 

You Don't Have To Choose To Ignore Him, Because We've Already Done It For You by Bryce Hidysmith

 Myself &amp;  Blucifer , a horse that cursed all these United States, Denver, CO.

Myself & Blucifer, a horse that cursed all these United States, Denver, CO.

< Soundtrack: Pixies - Holiday Song, Decemberists - Ben Franklin's Song, Moondog - Invocation >

Rare Earth's most recent video, The People Who Hate Us, is one of my favorite pieces of media that I've seen recently. It's made me think a bit about James Mill's History of British India. In the preface, Mill attempts to justify the writing of the book without knowing any Indian languages, nor ever having visited the subcontinent by suggesting that the British information gathering system was so good that it would be unecessary, even detrimental to try and get first hand information. James Mill's son, the tyke bomb John Stewart Mill's ideas are oddly related to the ideas stated by Evan Hadfield in the video concerning the comparative hedonic yield of different kinds of narrative and experiential exploitation in the depiction of peoples with variable power differentials. The interesting thing to note concerning those ideas is that J. S. Mill's Utilitarian moral philosophy requires the ability to accurately produce a shared unit of account between alien populations. Such divisions, be they geographic, ethnic, racial, gendered, class/caste, or even temporal/generational, provide such opportunities for arbitrage that obfuscation is the order of the day, and the measure is unevenly applied, sometimes to a three-fifths measure, sometimes not at all. In such a utilitarian schema, it matters not what the motivation for the obfuscation is. The assumption that the unit of account could symmetrically account for the lives of perspectives of alien parties is absurd on its head, ignoring the realm of the unknown unknown. This arbitrage can easily be concealed, and an untrue but public narrative is then proliferated, not accounting for the fraud that makes utilitarian accounting possible. 

The elder, James Mill's book is correspondent pretty directly to the ideas in Edward Said's Orientalism, though I can't remember if Said ever directly mentioned it. Said's basic idea is that there is a paradox of depiction: one is both able to have accurate information concerning a subject, as well as use the claim to having accurate information regarding that subject to state falsehoods. Thereby, one may change the way that the subject is treated, changing the subject itself. The whole system is a set of nonlinear feedback relationships between depictor and depicted, with the power held in the hand and eye of that which controls the feedback relationship of depiction, rather than either the image or the original. It seems like there's an overall theme, between Hadfield and Said against the Mills, of attempting to question the assumption that its possible to have complete information, and thus that all attempts at representation are misrepresentation. Both of the Mills assume that the information gathering infrastructure around them—especially the monetary credit allocation processes—are accurate, thereby assuming that its possible to engage in just action by acting within an already debased credit allocation system. Again, this is a willful act of bad faith. It is debatable as to whether or not the Utilitarian intention is viable within an accurate credit allocation system, but the model advocated by Mill the Younger and picked up by modern Utilitarians—especially the present Negative Utilitarian death cult—is limited again by this failure to produce and objective unit of account. This failure of the project of Objectivity has led to men like Said's work being taken up—both inside and outside of the ivory towers of the academy—as a potential justification for theoretically infinite violence for simply making incorrect good-faith assumptions. The Utilitarian perspective does not appeal to liars, it appeals to those privileged souls who have themselves been deceived. Yet, the proliferation of untruth out of incompetence is considered as awful as willful deception in much of the modern world. This lack of compassion is absurd. Ignorance changes the conditions of production so drastically that the young nerd who comes to Mill is not to be blamed for hoping that the world had attained an objective standard. Indeed, all the dominant propaganda has spoken to him, suggesting this to be the case. The question is how to develop viable error correction and model-extension protocols that can justify connection between peoples in good faith by all parties, rather than an accelerating decay into xenophobic depravity. There's no sense in trying to reform the failures of accounting of the past, that will simply perpetuate a cyclic violence, where ones efforts at reform are simply an over or under-compensated derivative effect on the original fraud.

The following paragraph from Kaplan's The Revenge of Geography has been quite dear to me since I read it for the first time around its publication in 2012:

"And yet within this sad acceptance there is hope: for by becoming more expert at reading the map, we can, helped by technology as the Arab Spring has attested, stretch some of the limits the map inflicts. That is the aim of my study—to have an appreciation of the map so that, counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it. For it is not only narrow-mindedness that leads to isolationism, but the overstretching of resources that causes an isolationist backlash."

This contains the proper emotional tone for the beginner's mind that can analyze the world in a proper fashion. In addition to the geographic map that Kaplan speaks of, there is also a map of the process of epistemology that is as invariant as the instantaneous state of any given territory. Technology—for example media technologies such as Twitter as in the Arab Spring, or printed copies of History of British India, or anything that might modify the physical or human landscape such as bulldozers or CRISPR—can contort geographic and indeed biological and cultural elements into more logistically (and by extension morally) advantageous topologies. However, it cannot change the basic relationship between depiction and depicted, map and territory, and thus the protocol for aspiring to truth in description will not be transcended by technological advancement, only made less physically or socially costly.

Of course, a cursory look at Said and others like him (Baudrillard, Taleb, etc.) makes it clear that while that the relationship of truth and depiction is clearly invariant in theory, it's certainly not invariant in practice, as any given perspective attempting to implement a process of accurate depiction is operating with limited information of the subject, the substrate, and the means of depiction. This leads to the only solution to this problem being an aspirational, rather than deterministic protocol, as any protocol stated to be deterministic would be fraudulent if developed by any actor with incomplete information, which is to say any actor that is not a literal god. This produces all sorts of opportunities for corruption, where cruel defection rears its head under the excuse of imperfection, needing to be policed by detecting laziness, malice and bad faith, rather than only incompetence, as an assumption that incompetence is the only problem would also assume that the protocol could be deterministic and formulated from a perspective of complete information.

These questions are increasingly dominant in my mind, and seem to be central to the questions of civilizational development. An increasing consensus that I'm seeing among those I respect is that one must attempt to embrace the Achaemenid strategy of strategic centralization without loss of diversity, which is something that has been completely lost in the modern world at least partially because the selection pressures that used to generate an aristocracy competent enough to speak honestly no longer exists. Without an administrative class that is competent at speaking the truth, it is impossible to even begin answering the questions that Said, Hadfield, and others have brought up, and without answering those questions, Utilitarians like Mill are silly children, failing to notice what they don't know. The last paragraph of Herodotus is perhaps the earliest complete written example of the thought that Kaplan expressed earlier. (This is from the Godley translation, and though I prefer the Greene I don't have it on hand at the moment.)

This Artaÿctes who was crucified was grandson to that Artembares who instructed the Persians in a design which they took from him and laid before Cyrus; this was its purport: “Seeing that Zeus grants lordship to the Persian people, and to you, Cyrus, among them, by bringing Astyages low, let us now remove out of the little and rugged land that we possess and take to ourselves one that is better. There be many such on our borders, and many further distant; if we take one of these we shall have more reasons for renown. It is but reasonable that a ruling people should act thus; for when shall we have a fairer occasion than now, when we are lords of so many men and of all Asia?” Cyrus heard them, and found nought to marvel at in their design; “Do so,” said he; “but if you do, make ready to be no longer rulers, but subjects. Soft lands breed soft men; wondrous fruits of the earth and valiant warriors grow not from the same soil.” Thereat the Persians saw that Cyrus reasoned better than they, and they departed from before him, choosing rather to be rulers on a barren mountain side than slaves dwelling in tilled valleys.

I share this as an expression of the basic behavior that would grant one the credibility to depict the world, as in a way it is a way of being able to have the competence to decide how the world depicts you. I am not speaking of the action taken by Cyrus to relocate his people to the steppe, to naturally select them as warriors, but rather the wisdom of Cyrus to be willing to self-modify, to notice that he is his self and his circumstances, but in fact primarily his circumstances and that a significant quantity (if not a majority) of the ways that he is able to influence his self come from changing his circumstances. This, of course, is a directly analogous to the system of depiction from Said. Without this cynical, literal expression of self-control through environmental selection, it is unlikely that anyone is competent to rule even a rag-heap, much less something as influential as a broadsheet newspaper. Of course, a just ruler would also lend the potential mastery of circumstance to the ruled once they were ready, and the denial of that gift during those few moments when it might have been possible has been one of the greatest tragedies of the ancient and modern worlds.

 Passargade, by Eugène Flandin, 1840

Passargade, by Eugène Flandin, 1840

The Arrogance of a Private Theology by Bryce Hidysmith

 Dancing Maenad from the Capitoline Museums

Dancing Maenad from the Capitoline Museums

I just read Anne Carson's new version of Euripides' The Bakkhai from a sickbed, and a sequence in the middle struck me more than perhaps anything else in the play:

It moves
so slowly,
—the force of the gods—
yet it is absolutely guaranteed
to arrive.
To punish
human folly
and the arrogance
of a private theology.
how a god can hide
and then leap out
on the unholy man.
To think or act outside the law is never right.
But this is valid—
The thing we call Daimonic
fixed in law and custom
grown out of nature itself,

(The formatting is unfortunately my own, as digital publishing does not allow for a replication of Carson's.)

It was an oddly abstract and relational sequence for a play whose poetics are almost entirely anchored in either the naturalistic dialog or keenly specified poetics, such as listing all the different kinds of green Thebes is to garland itself with in worship of the coming of Dionysos from the east.

Still, it does capture the core of the play's moral message, should there be one at all. What are the gods but impersonal manifestations of personal but common truths? Those structures that construct us cannot be suppressed without a disintegration of the human identity. Such suppression is an illusion, they will rise again after coming out of hiding. Such structures must be integrated, rather than amputated. Should they be local to circumstance, their removal is equivalent to the removal of the circumstance, but the potential for re-emergence is not removed unless the character of the organism is such that it lacks the traits that allowed for their situational expression in the first place. Their extinction is ours, even if our alien descendants were to continue to be fruitful and multiply. Perhaps those critics of the Christian Era looked on the text as an expression of an atavistic era where such deeds were required, and in the year of our lord such wills might be removed through castigation as sin. Yet, such talk sounds of self-congradulation and the amputation of the minds-eye. If one is to reject those things that make you up, the rejection must come from a place of truly understanding—even loving—that which is to be rejected. Else, the allure of the unknown should remain one's tireless guide.

I Recall You Saying You Believe We Will All Be Born Again by Bryce Hidysmith

 Face of    "The Judge"  a slot machine in a small museum in Old Town of San Diego.

Face of "The Judge" a slot machine in a small museum in Old Town of San Diego.

< Soundtrack: Molly Nilsson - Ugly Girl / World Order - Permanent Revolution >

In an informal conversation in early October, D. S. and F. L. pointed out an incoherence in my framing questions of ethics in terms of the maximization of consent, rather than the maximization of choice. I had a rather strong emotional reaction, defending the idea of consent maximization in such a way that I think I was subconsciously attempting to avoid listening to their counterpoint. To criticize anything even tangentially related to the notion of consent in this day and age is one of the greatest of taboos, but it is important to note that this criticism of terminology was in service of the maximization of individual consent, not its minimization. This conversation did not change the objectives of my conception of an ethical life, rather that it changed the way that one must practice the art of living in order to aspire to those same objectives, drawing light on the critical role of exacting language in philosophical inquiry and jurisprudence. This is perhaps the most critical rectification of names in the postmodern environment, as the two terms—choice and consent—are read in a largely emotional way by most demographics. Such an emotional reading tracks tribal affiliation rather than structural argument, creating an impossibility of common ethical principles even interior to specific political aesthetics. This occurs simultaneously to a degree of extreme societal pillarization, wherein given political aesthetics are contrary enough to each other—in fact frequently leading to a disgust response—that cross-pollination is almost impossible. I don't think I would even be able to notice this problem if I had not been lived for the majority of my youth in the marches between Silicon Valley and San Francisco, a crosshatched borderland between the Social Justice Pillar and the TechnoLibertarian Pillar, each of whom has radically different and wholly incomplete insights concerning ethical subjects. I also don't think that I would be finding myself thinking in terms of specified language if I hadn't just gotten up and left, finding myself in the New Age Pillar, which seems to have an allergy to clarity of thought. As Vassar's put it recently, one wants to be on the side of truth and beauty, allied against unity.

To begin, it is clear that the principles of any ethical system that is not simply willful solipsism must be based on the recognition of the experiences of others, else the greatest good would be individualistic hedonism. Under willful solipsism, ethics would simply be a process of knowing one's own preferences and exerting them. While solipsism is a consistent proposition for resolving all contradiction, we can reject it out of hand as it is a selective interpretation of data, debased in epistemic hygiene. While it is unreasonable to apply the principle of charity to all reports in a given environment, it is equally unreasonable to apply it to the qualia of one's own experience. One must note at least a morphological similarity between the self and others; if one is to deny the potential for direct recognition of psychological similarity, one must at least note anatomical similarity and assume, as per Occam's Razor, that the other's morphological self similarity implies some degree of experiential self-similarity, and that it is likely an exceptional case if it does not. For instance, in the case of mannequins, statues, and other effigies, the lack of interior self-similarity should be obviously enough to dismiss the notion that the dead or never-alive could be deserving of the same care as the living, and indeed the construction of effigies is an exceptional event in the history of life on earth. The recognition of the experiences of others causes one to envision them as other moral patients as one would evaluate oneself. They are not simply spooks. At least limited action according to their needs and desires is a moral necessity if the consequence of action to them might be as experientially extreme as the consequence of action to yourself. Otherwise, the correct action is resource extraction or the development of an individually beneficial environment of reciprocal altruism.

This base principle is then applied in the balancing act of integrating the needs and desires of the self with others. It matters not what those needs and desires are, for the purposes of this essay they can be left entirely abstract as it is the process of resolving contradictions between them that interests us, not the specific content.  One must attempt to understand the process by which one evaluates the validity of one's own experience while also remembering that such process must be abstracted to the general category that might contain any agent evaluating their own experiential validity. This basic tenet of moral skepticism leaves one with the potentially frustratingly vague understanding that the only possible ethics is a meta-ethics of balancing individuals' ethical systems. Anything else would be inherently tyrannical, though potentially a benevolent tyranny if the tyrant in question was able to know all individuals better than they knew themselves. This, however, would have its own wicked problem of attempting to verify the asymmetric information of the tyrant, which I would conjecture would likely be framed in metaethical terms or be something akin to a cosmic con job. Provided that one is not a chauvinist taking the self's ignorance as a clue and presuming that one's personally derived ethics is somehow universalizable without any modicum of evidence of this being the case for anyone else, one comes to the swift conclusion that ethical systems local to a given agent must be checked for validity by a metaethical system to allow more than one agent to interact without disaster.

This leads us cleanly into the recognition that (meta)ethical problems always bottom out on communication dynamics. The derivation of that metaethical system must be based on a protocol ensuring mutual intelligibility. There are of course such individuals who are fully amoral, but the ethical problem would never be framed from their perspective, and the only necessary ethical question concerning them is how their malice can be contained or eliminated without cruelty. The problem of ethics is not the existence of evil, but confusion among those who aspire to good. The most common (if insufficient) formulation of such a confusion-reducing communication protocol is Hillel's Golden Rule, commonly incorrectly attributed (by Christians) to Jesus of Nazareth, wherein one attempts to simulate the other as the self and count wounds against the other as wounds against the self.

The Golden Rule is a framing of trust as self-similarity, rather than trust as symmetric communication, and fails in light of any non-obvious diversity of moral patients, even if that diversity is simply the existence of multiple individuals of a similar demographic, all possessing opaque minds. Assumption of self-similarity fails with any level of diversity that cannot be immediately simulated. One cannot discern proper conduct to an alien from proper conduct to the self. Such conduct must be discerned either from accurate simulation or empirical observation. Without an ethical system that is able to respond and indeed love the alien, one reduces society to an illiberal hive of atomized individuals, bereft of all potentially meaningful—that is to say surprising—interactions.

There is, of course, some set of similar desires between moral patients. Obvious similarities are easily intuited, such as the fact that one should not damage the bodies of others as one would hope that one's body was left intact, but something ambiguous like informational violence is a far thornier issue. If one says a word that inspires violence by the listener against themself, who is the cause to blame? From a purely causal point of view, the speaker is. One could respond to this ethical problem through the prohibition of speech, for the transit of information can always lead to unforeseen consequences, and the infinite pileup of unknown unknowns results in a blanket prohibition against all action that might have an externalizing effect, leading either to obligate solipsism or suicide. This is madness. Yet, this is madness that exists in less extreme forms in the discourse concerning violence both physical and informational, which trends towards absurdity as it does not seem to question its central assumptions. The Golden Rule position perhaps most clearly stated as a potentially viable relational structure by Rawls in his statements about the Veil of Ignorance, simply by taking away anything that might make the individuals in the system distinctive. While I disagree with some of his conclusions about the optimal structure of a society in the modern context—for instance he and I have very different opinions about representative democracy—his formulation of the problem in abstract is coherent and provides a good example of what a context-free metaethics looks like. It seems necessary then to focus on a specific section of the hypothetical and ahistorical problem of the design of social contracts. But, first it is necessary to debunk the supposed potential of Rawls' hypothetical design to produce a wholly symmetric power dynamic inside of a population.

Rawls, being a political philosopher, does not focus on the psychologies of the individuals he is describing so much as the constraints that a theoretically infinitely malicious individual might be tempered by. Political philosophy is often blinded by its inability to see individuals, except as expressions of ideologies even when the ideology and the individual are impossible to disentangle. The psychology of M. K. Ghandi is far less amenable to the assumption that he was an averge example of his contingent than the psychology of Napoleon Bonaparte, man of the world. Rawls, like almost all political philosophy since the Second World War, frames the task of political philosophy as an attempt to have good ideologies win out over bad ones, without ever really questioning whether or not the ideology is the proper medium for installing a virtuous society.

The central blindspot of this ideological model of the world is the variance of individuals. I have believed (similarly to Robert Michels) for quite some time in a fundamental character of positional strategic asymmetry in any diverse multi-agent system that cannot be diffused by even the best-designed social contract. A brief summary of the reason for this is worth transmitting, even without confidence that it will be clear except in an (as yet forthcoming) longform piece: Take the notion that evolutionary strategic capacity is the ability to adapt under potentially adversarial uncertainty. If a system of agents that contains agents that are sufficiently different to be only probabilistically simulated in the minds of other agents rather than deterministically simulated, then it is possible to artificially create an asymmetry of predictive capacity and thus adaptive capacity between two agents by acting contrary to a correct estimate of a collectively calculated Schelling Point. While the Schelling Point may itself be a Nash Equilibrium, the lack of organic transparency between agents leaves a situation where it is still possible to gain a strategic advantage by defecting and being unpredictable as one's own unpredictability allows the individual to exploit the predictability of the other. While it may not be advantageous for the powerful to use power differentials, that does not mean that the power differentials in question simply cease to exist even if they are this most basic instantiation of a Prisoner's Dilemma.

Rawls presumes that the right way to gain a properly functional community is to position them behind the veil of ignorance and get them to agree on a set of constraints that they would be comfortable conforming to from any given position within the territory governed by the constraint set. There is a flaw, however. The veil of ignorance thought experiment is—intentionally or not—propagandistically malformed by stating itself as a thought experiment, and in doing so deflecting some of the responsibility that would be contained in it if it was written by a culture that believed in randomly assigned (rather than dharmically dispositional) reincarnation, where the self does indeed live behind a veil of ignorance in the next generation. By circumventing real circumstances, it allows one to assume that the social contract and the population are not an interdependent whole, and in Rawls' case largely proliferated uninspired temporally and geographically local norms rather than attempting a serious discussion of utopian potential. The position of the veil of ignorance—a council of spirits in a waiting room before reincarnation—is useful only as a way to draw attention to the traits of identities and social contracts that would be advantageous to instantiate in any environment whatsoever, for the objective of general betterment is the same in all environments as the inconceivably vast majority of general betterment is locked behind the transcendence of local constraints. Even if one does not prescribe to a Singulatarian perspective, the recognition of technological potential shows this to be the case, provided one does not believe in a fundamental toxicity of technology, wherein the primitive communism of a hunter-gatherer society seems to be the optimal state of affairs. Even within the hunter-gatherer context, technology of social relation rather than material reconfiguration is still a method of improving the psychological and physical condition of the tribe without long-term cost. Furthermore, if fundamental strategic asymmetry in the form of defection by Schelling Point reversal, as described above, is immutably a part of social organizations that are not hive minds, it is then required for us to figure out how it is possible to avoid the asymmetric power being used in such a way as to result in a total breakdown of trust. This is akin to ensuring that nobody is placed in a position so intolerable that defection in prisoners dilemmas and the subsequent proliferation of zero-sum strategies is the only viable lifestyle. If power cannot be removed from play, the system of social relations must simply position asymmetric power in such a location in its hierarchy that said asymmetric power is always coupled with equally metaethical decision-making. The key is simply figuring out how this can be accomplished.

The practical considerations of engineering environments of justice—distributive or otherwise—must be assumed to instead be questions of continuous artificial population selection and organization, rather than purely constitutional design. While a constitution can be agreed upon by a set of agents as more valuable to collaborate with than to defect against, one must still be maintaining the necessary selection pressures that cause one to accurately interpret and good-faith accept such a constitution in the first place. Thus, the practical variant of Rawls' theoretical problem is more related to searching for or cultivating a culture that can then be used to instantiate the behavioral program of a given constitution, treating the text of the social contract itself as only one method of attempting to produce the desired environment. However, the existence of a symmetrically interpretable text is the only way that one can produce homogenous norms of deontological or consequentialist ethics, both of which are necessary adaptations to do good in a wide variety of circumstances that cannot be accounted for under other circumstances. Yet, such literate paradigms are downstream from the virtue of literacy, and thus downstream from virtue ethics itself. All behaviors are deterministically bounded as to the vices and virtuous traits of the agent in question. At the most basic level, this determinism is caused by the ontology of the individuals before any judgments are made, as such judgments must be specified using the vocabulary admissible to the ontology. This is where we return to the point where F. and D. corrected my model from consent optimization to choice maximization, as there is a meaningful difference in effect when one implements a metaethical system based on consent, versus when one implements one based on choice.

Consent is a concept that must be assessed by comparison to a counterfactual of the potential event not having occurred. Dependant on the temporal perspective of the assessment, consent is one of two concepts: a proactive and a retroactive form. One may desire or not desire for something to happen, and one may consider it desirable that something did or did not happen after the fact. This produces a contradiction: one might proactively consent to the description of an event, but not retroactively consent to the same event. Or, the inverse: one might experience something good but unpredictable, and have hoped that one's past self had consented to an action that could not have been described accurately. Additionally, the communication process around describing either proactive or retroactive models falls to the same problem—should an event be dependent on the actions of another, they are themselves prey to the same paradox, and additionally prey to all sorts of faults in communication increasing error. Consent—the sense of individuals determining in hindsight that the various components of lives were worth experiencing or, from foresight, could be worth experiencing—is obviously a good thing. Yet, the design of a formal ethical system cannot be based on optimizing for consent alone as it is a second order effect to the decision-making of the individuals involved in any given event that could or could not be consented to, regardless of temporal perspective on the event itself. The question is whether or not the individuals whose behaviors locally effect the event in question constrain the ability of others local to the event to make choices, either through direct, forceful prohibition or subtle obfuscation. The decision itself determines the circumstance that the individual then experiences and assesses. Thus, an argument of efficiency has already been formed as it makes sense to invest all effort in the effectiveness of such decisions to promote proactively or retroactively benevolent states in individuals as justified by the individuals themselves.

Yet, it is not efficiency alone that justifies the reformulation of ethics around choice-optimization rather than consent-optimization. There is also a negative justification: the direct optimization for either proactive or retroactive consent by an outside actor leads to an attempt to predict and constrain the action of that individual, which constitutes a potential consent violation all its own as it denies them access to the potential breadth of consensual states that they might traverse of their own volition. It is impossible to know the other as well as the other knows themself. Even if the outside actor is the past-self of the future-individual who could assess consent retroactively, state-traversal is similarly constrained as if it was a different individual altogether. The only viable solution to take us out of this problem of contradiction is to simply focus all efforts on improving the decisionmaking of individuals in a Pareto Optimal fashion, so that the free choice of individuals does not externalize violence or deception that constrains the potential set of choices of the individual, either by artificially limiting their options or interfering with their mental process of evaluation so as to reflexively control them. The amputation of individual choice kills the potential for either future joy, or potentially informative mistakes, themselves a road for future joy. From this abstract of a perspective, it is the only crime in existence. From this abstract perspective, the only political virtue is the use of power to increase the number of meaningful choices that the given individuals in a political order can make during their lifespan, a perspective that one might consider to be relatively similar to the infinite Game position taken by James P. Carse in Finite and Infinite Games.

So, one must optimize for consent indirectly, by attempting to track the consequences of personal action, and enable others to track the consequences of their actions as well. One primary clue presents itself for how to do this: a hygiene of communication, the same basic norm that formed the initial correction from F. and D that spawned this essay. Such communication hygiene can be understood to comprise three components: an intention of precision and accuracy, a rejection of silencing, and an insistence on symmetrically intelligible communication. (These principles may, potentially, be upended in cases where it is necessary to contain malicious actors.) Those three principles constitute the ethical obligation of individuals to increase the amount of useful information that others can use to navigate the process of making choices. Provided that these principles are embraced, I would conjecture that given sufficient time, the disembodied spirits behind Rawls' veil would by definition design the full variance of potential lives worth living that their minds could envision. Potentially, it is also necessary to allow for the potential of precommitment, as one might want to develop bounded adversarial environments such as GANs or kink, for various reasons, but that is open for debate.

Note On Recreational Labor by Bryce Hidysmith

< The Isley Bros. - Shout & Pharmakon - Bestial Burden, the last of which I saw much of performed at Elbo Room back in June or July when a raw version of this was written. It is going to be one of those shows I remember for the rest of my life. > 

I attended Ephemerisle for the first time in four years this summer. This year was a bit different than the last few. The usual hutong of sail and houseboats was replaced by a massive surplus barge and several other hand-made platforms—among them the fabulously engineered Flatland, and the Wonderland Teahouse, which had, among other things, a patch of living grass to lay about on while staring at the stars, floating in the delta. The last time I went to Ephemerisle, 2014, I stayed for about 24 hours in total. I'd sailed up with a couple of old friends from SFØ in an old fiberglass Pearson and, once I was actually at the event, realized that there just wasn't really anything happening or anything that I felt a strong need to do, so I left, somehow in the process meeting Richard from Numerai for the first time while waiting for my ferry back to the mainland. Still, the clear thing that I felt while I was there that last time was that it wasn't for me, and I couldn't figure out why. It seemed like it was a place where people who had responsibilities they didn't care about off came to let off steam by engaging in recreational labor. It made more sense to solve complex anchoring puzzles than to start a Fight Club. The whole affair is a curious coping mechanism. The experience of the festival circuit is often not actually that extreme, it's often the prosaic and frankly unpleasant tasks of making sure the portable toilets don't fall into the water and there's a proper bumper on the dock, and that while you're doing that, you don't drop a borrowed impact driver into the water. It's recreational work on the water: a hostile environment that wants to consume all of your stuff and possibly drown you. Simultaneously to the work, there's the need to make sure that a bunch of lost party kids (of which I was one not too long ago) or insecure undergrads don't do anything stupid and instead can be integrated in a way that's symbiotically beneficial to everyone involved. 

The creation of a system like Ephemerisle creates a clear understanding just how much you're externalizing, whether its environmental or informational. The feedback loops are short enough that you can actually see if you made things better or fucked them up more. The thing that is critically important, however, is that while Ephemerisle participants are very conscious of their consumption of physical resources and can, generally speaking, let themselves off the hook for consuming a rather high amount of gas and foodstuffs—though likely less than they would in an urban environment—they can much less easily let themselves off the hook for informational pollution and overconsumption. If you borrow a tool and don't give it back, you might completely fuck someone over who need it to literally fix the land you're standing on. Hell, you don't even want to be macho about how tough or good at things you are. Myself, while only overextending slightly, dropped a wrench in the water at some point by mistake and felt quite bad about it, both because I'd destroyed someone's gear and also made everything genuinely more difficult to accomplish. Recreational labor is constrained by its need for enjoyment to take on the character of local socialism, typically either filtered through a military or a hippie aesthetic of coordination. It is a method for retraining that lost art of producing superorganisms, which seems to have been largely lost in American populations by the end of the 1970s except in the case of media-controlled subculture. 

Goffman Corruption In America, Or Regarding BTC@10K by Bryce Hidysmith

< Soundtrack: Hatari - X >

The modern strategic environment is perhaps the first occasion where the performative aspects of intra-class competition in ruling parties extends to their investment strategies. When Nero attempted to use his position to start an acting career in spite of the social horror, the effects of this conflict of expression and culture were just a sideshow in the overall defection of the Julio-Claudians from the business of administration. Furthermore, these attempts at performance as a method of gaining validation were limited to the ruling classes. When the Heian got so addicted to art the government began to collapse, they never demanded that the peasants stop being peasants. The signaling apparatuses of ruling classes have typically been limited to the landed. Indeed, being landed demands de facto owning a number of souls to till that land in the traditional way. To be landed is also to have access to a population that is symbiotic to the land, where the tenant lord of the land extracts the surplus. While the game of Russian Czarist politics played out, one was never so far from the means of agricultural production that one could totally dissociate as to the standard behavior of the serfs that produce a surplus for capture. The robota necessary for automating those princes' lives were the same species as them, but still had to be treated as mere automata. No matter how sophisticated or theatrical the power struggles of the ruling class became, the decadence of the rulers never infected the ruled to the extent that it corrupted their ability to generate a surplus.

Decadence can infect the workers. Such decadence was just a death sentence before globalism. It seems as though this type of decadence might be termed "Goffman Corruption" in reference to the sociologist of draumaturgical analysis. We should define Goffman Corruption as the notion that coordination systems waste energy when the abstract components of their signaling apparatus fail to depict anything outside of themselves, and are not coupled to representative components. The energy spent on this signaling process is simply lost. The coordination costs too much, embedded in costly rituals. Metonymically, the trouble is now that, at least in America, the ruling class also wears Jeans; the whole culture's engaged in some sort of bizarre performative workingman cosplay. This is not to say that the exploitation of the working class is a good thing—far from it—but rather that there is something far worse than simply exploiting the working class: eliminating it. The assumption of a unified economic body in a generalized middle class has created a situation where attempts at performing status have created an environment where there is a fractal worship of financial leverage, influencing the way that the whole economy is structured. It is not as though the whole population is one class, it is as though the whole population has to narratize themselves as wearing the same brand of bootstraps to pull themselves up with. America exports control. It's common to suggest that the Chinese economy is overbuilt on exports, but America is overbuilt on being a city on a hill that is able to maintain an exceptionalist position. Don't be the first person to stop clapping for Stalin, translates to don't be the sucker who ever did any work in modern American capitalism. It's not as though doing work is taboo, exactly, its that doing work now, rather on must have already done the work to self-make in order to have relevant power. Money is still assumed to be the viable metric of worth, and thus it becomes a convergent instrumental goal to look like one has enough money to get enough money to be relevant. Its a perfectly fractal mentality where one produces growth out of growth, rather than growth out of the work of muscles on material. 

This fractal attempt at exceptionalism has resulted in a situation where there is increasingly little reward for doing actual work. The only populations that engage in physical labor are those who don't have any options. This is a massive problem, as it seems as though Ricardo's law of rent only operates when there is the possibility of going out to a frontier and living off the land, using the comparative advantages that are built into your own body and mind. The Schumpeterian notion of rent suggests that the same dynamics suggested by Ricardo and Smith are also possible from an innovation perspective during the phase when the innovation in question has not been diffused additionally assumes that innovations are to be reliably diffused into the commons. If one is to assume that the Ricardian rent dynamics have been transposed to a virtual environment, one has not sufficiently reified Schumpeterian Rent to Ricardian Rent, as Schumpeterian Rent would assume somehow that the dynamics of trade include diffusion, rather than scarcity and comparative advantage. In fact, the Bitcoin example suggests that the Schumpeterian version of the system incentivizes individuals to simply develop new and inventive methods of enforcing scarcity, so as to rent seek from innovations in rent seeking. Bitcoin seems like an almost perfect example of this at this stage, though it could have been so much more if it was reliably grounded through a coordination system interfacing with physical reality. It's more profitable to find inventive ways to permanently control a zero-sum system than actually build anything positive-sum, and it seems like we're watching an escalation dominance strategy take over Bitcoin in this manner before likely throwing away their market dominance so they can start again, buying the dip. 

...With Apologies to the Potential Varelse by Bryce Hidysmith

 Definitely an example of Alienism, but not in the way you're thinking.

Definitely an example of Alienism, but not in the way you're thinking.

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The archaic term Alienist, seems to be a much more honest description of the profession of studying psychopathology than Clinical Psychiatrist or anything else currently in vogue. This is perhaps the Platonist in me speaking too loudly over modern voices that attempt to temperance but simply confuse it with agreeableness, but Plato/Socrates' claim that one does not intentionally do evil, and instead only does evil through ignorance begins to make one wonder if the earlier models of psychology had something far more viable than current ones.

While Freud and his analogues were and are certainly showmen fond of retroactive addenda and unable to meet the Popperian standard, there is something that has been lost with the introduction of the Popperian standard as an engineering specification masquerading as a scientific method. That is not to say anything bad about Popper's falsification, rather that it is massively good in the specific context of the analysis of bounded phenomena. In a discipline such as psychology that handles the analysis of subjects that are as complex as the observers themselves, it seems as though there is a need for tempered inductive reasoning and pure rationalism outside of empiricism to generate a sufficiently complex model that might then be testable, though likely not falsifiable as the replicability of experiments will be dubious at best. This seems to point to the notion that sciences that are either anthrocomplex or at the same scale as anthrocomplex systems will never be able to be sufficiently bounded, and that the analysis of anthrocomplex domains will be limited to inductive reasoning from what are effectively historical events, which by their nature can only happen once. This matters not if we're talking about the Milgram Experiment or the Crimean War, both have the same limits to analysis unless one is somehow able to clone the set of individual humans that engaged in these events and place them in an identical physical environment with identical memories at to how they got there. This has a further implication that the analysis of biological causality as, for example, in the heritability of schizophrenia that cannot be pinned down to a set of concretely documented processes of physical mechanisms is capable of generating only the same type of limited inductive conclusions as historic examples. This is not to say that the information gained from these kinds of analyses is not valuable—far from it. Rather, it is simply not the same thing as documenting a clear, falsifiable mechanism.

Regardless, before psychology attempted and failed to meet the Popperian standard, the word Alienist was still sometimes used. It seems to be a far more accurate assessment of what the role of clinical psychology and psychiatry has always been when it has been effective. Philosophical Psychology and Experimental Psychology should be understood to be distinct disciplines. (I believe it was Taylor who first made this argument, though I can't remember the volume.) All three of them are obviously interrelated, but form different practices of coming to psychological truth. The role of Clinical Psychology is the application of information gained in all three disciplines to have a desired effect. One might better term it "field" psychology to encompass the many territories that are similar to, but distinct to clinical psychology such as public relations/propaganda, user experience design, military strategy, and all other disciplines that include the intentional modification of minds for a given purpose. One must presume that the tools of clinical psychology do not require one to swear a Hippocratic Oath, else what would the point of swearing the oath be in the first place? One must also not presume that there is a great functional difference between those that minted the banner of Psychology in the nineteenth century, and the various scholars, clerics, and others who practiced similar crafts in previous eras. For instance, the notion that Thomas Aquinas or Augustine of Hippo are not somehow part of the tradition of psychological analysis as they are marked as solely theological is patently absurd. Stage magic, for instance, has a clear element in common with clinical psychology, but has enough other elements in it that it must be understood to be a hybrid discipline like many of the others above. For example, the psychological aspects of public relations do not include the logistical aspects.

It seems as though there's a clear, coherent convergence inside of the domain of clinical psychology that unifies all of the examples above and more. Clinical psychology is about the use of asymmetric—or in other words alien—information for a purpose. It doesn't matter if the usage of asymmetric information is an attempt to integrate the internal model of a patient to grant them further autonomy in getting over fears that they can know to be irrational, or the exploitation of dark patterns in user experience design. Both of them are based on the usage of alien information, either to preserve the asymmetry of information or integrate it. This seems a coherent reunification of the early psychoanalytic predilection with the unconscious and later, more structured analysis of the nature of the mind as a whole. Thus, it seems as though the term Alienist, shouldn't have become remotely archaic if we were taxonomizing things as literally as possible, rather than engaging in the standard scholarly pursuit of conflating the organizational movement with the field of study or practice. Alienism should be understood to be the superset of skills that involve the manipulation of asymmetric information, which of course includes things like clinical psychology.